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Resume
Le present memoire vise a faire enquete sur de tels debats dans Ie domaine de
gouvernance des societes pour Ie fait qu'il y a ou aura de changements dramatiques dans
la structure des acticites des societes, par exemple, la nature de travail et I'organisation
des corporations, ainsi que les influences des reformes financieres. De plus, l'emergence
de l'investissement institutionnel dans Ie marche financier, Ie progression de
globalisation et Ie developpement de commerce electronique ont d'influence sur
gouvernance des societes tant au Canada qu'en Chine.
II y a une magnitude immense de discussion sur les aspects varies de gouvernance
des societes dans Ie domaine academique. Ce memoire presente une etude de
comparaison detaillee sur les deux systemes differents de gouvernance des societes
concernant trois aspects speciaux de gouvernance des societes, y compris Ie conseil
d'administration, les roles des banques et les investisseurs dans les deux etats, ainsi que
les reformes en Chine, de plus, la convergence des deux systemes de gouvernance des
societes est introduite.
Mots-des: Gouvernance des societes, convergence, conseil d' administration,
actionnaire, reforme, Canada, Chine
Abstract
This thesis aims to consider the debates in the field of corporate governance in the
fact that there have been and will be dramatic changes in the structure of corporate
activities, such as the nature of work and the organization of corporations, as well as the
influences of reforms in the financial reforms. Moreover, the emergence of institutional
investment in the financial markets, the process of globalization and the development of
electronic commerce have the influences on the corporate governance both in Canada and
in China.
There is an immense magnitude of discussion on various aspects of corporate
governance in the academic field. This thesis will focus on comparing two rather
distinctive systems of corporate governance, with respect to three specific aspects of the
corporate governance. Those are: the board of directors, the role of shareholders, the roles
of banks and investors in the two countries, also the reforms in China. Moreover, the
convergence of the two corporate governance systems is introduced.
Key words: Corporate governance, convergence, board of directors, shareholder,
reform, Canada, China.
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INTRODUCTION
The Perspective
Corporate governance is presently one of the major issues in corporate law.
One could argue that its importance may arise from the fact that many academics
and capitalists I at the beginning of last century could not imagine the nascent
division between ownership and control lasting to give rise to the issues of
corporate governance that we have today. It is a field which concentrates on the
relationship between various participants in determining the direction and
performance of corporations. Sheridan and Kendall, suggest that "... different
countries have different ideas as to what constitutes good corporate governance ...
nowhere does anyone appear to have defined corporate governance per se.,,2
Most of the traditional academic researches with regards to the corporate
governance concern the two mains models of corporate governance in the world, i.e.
the convergence or comparison between the Anglo-Saxon system and the
Continental-European system. Compared with these types of studies, there are few
papers using empirical evidence to examine the corporate governance convergence
between China and Canada. In the former country, corporate governance is at its
emerging stage; in the latter country, corporate governance is not a typical
Anglo-Saxon model. During the recent years, with the development of the
economic growth and the rapid economic reform in China, the Chinese system of
corporate governance attracts much more attention in academic studies.
I See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in
Corporate Governance (1989) 75 Iowa L. Rev. I at 2-3. The authors state that both Adam Smith and
Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means questioned the viability of large corporations where ownership was
separate from control.
2 See Sheridan, T. and Kendall, N. Corporate Governance, An Action Plan for Profitability and
Business Success, (London: Financial/Pitman Publishing, 1992).
4In North-America, as Enron slid into bankruptcy in the fall of 2001, it had
devastating effects on the American system of corporate governance. The focus on
corporate governance in the "post-Enron era" also follows a pattern of renewed
interest in corporate governance after other corporate failure in the United Stated.
Failures in corporate governance have been linked to corporate performance in the
United States as well as in Canada. It is inevitable for the academic research to
doubt the effectiveness of American system of corporate governance and also the
cleanness of the Canadian system of corporate governance which is considered to
possess similar characteristics to the United States, provoking widespread demands
for governance reform globally. However, it is not the case and various Canadian
attributes differ from American ones because of distinct local input.
Despite different starting points, different political and economic systems, there
has been a trend toward the convergence of different systems of corporate
governance around the world in recent years.3 Trade and investment liberalization
has put increasing pressure on firms to adapt and adjust. Moreover, the global
providers ofmarket finance, most Anglo-Saxon or other Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) based institutions are increasingly
demanding uniformity of different systems of corporate governance. All these are
the key drivers for the convergence of corporate governance. In the past one or two
decades, corporate governance has become one ofthe dominant policy issues in the
United States, United Kingdom, and lately particularly in Continental Europe and
Japan. It has also been one of the most hotly contested issues in the transitional
economies since mid-1990s and caught a great deal of attention in the development
debate in the wake of the Asian financial crisis.4
3 See Nestor, Stilpon, and John Thompson, Corporate Governance Patterns in DECD Economies:
Is Convergence Underway? In Nestor, Stilpon, and Takahiro Yasui, eds., Corporate Governance in
Asia: A Comparative Perspective (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development,
2000), at 19-43.
4 Berglof, Eric and Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden. 1999. "The Changing Corporate Governance
Paradigm: Implication for Transition and Development Countries". Working Paper, Stockholm
5The choice and purpose of a research direction is a personal and political one.
It must fulfill certain academic requirements yet should also relate to the interests of
the writer if he is to engage with his subject matter. Thus, the choice of this thesis is
to analyze the convergence and comparison of two different systems of corporate
governance both in Canada and in China.
Since each countries and economic systems around the world face the same
problems with regards to the corporate governance, the comparative approach to
corporate governance has attracted considerable attention over the 90's of last
century. Since that time, the increasing awareness around the world of issues with
regards to corporate governance has been reflected in different official reports.
Some of these reports include American Law Institute Report (1992),5 NACD
Reports (1994 and 1996) in the United States, the Cadbury Report (1992), the
Greenbury Report (1995), the Hampel Report (1998), the Smith Report (2003) and
the Higgs Report (2003) in the United Kingdom. Dey Report6 (1994) in Canada,
Vienot Reports (1995 and 1999/ in France, etc.
The purpose for the ongoing debates of this thesis in the field of corporate
governance is the fact that there have been and will be dramatic changes in the
structure of corporate activities in the areas such as the nature of work and the
organization of corporations, as well as the influences of reforms in the financial
reforms. Moreover, the emergence of institutional investment in the financial
markets, the process of globalization and the development of electronic commerce
have the influences on the corporate governance both in Canada and in China. All
School of Economics.
5 American Law Institute ("ALI"), Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis &
Recommendations.
6 Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada, Where Were the
Directors: Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (Dey Report) I994
7 Conseil National du Patronat Fran9ais (CNPF) & Association Fran9aise des Entreprises Privees
(AFEP), Report of the Committee on Corporate Goverance (Vienot II) (July I999), The Boards of
Directors of Listed Companies in France (Vienot I) (July I995).
6these changes will lead the good corporate governance both in Canada and in China,
however, the good corporate governance will not result from mere changes. Good
corporate governance will also depend heavily on the successful reform of
government agencies and the legal system. From this point of view, a legal
framework of corporate governance plays an important role in the good corporate
governance construction.
Methodology
The volume of materials concerning corporate governance is vast and growing
exponentially around the world. Besides the related articles and treatises on the
topic of the two countries, the economic, political and legal literature of the
different countries and different institutional organizations, the numerous laws,
listing requirements regulations address corporate governance issues. Among all
these literature, a unique group of corporate governance recommendations called
"codes," "reports," "principles," or "guidelines," has appeared in the 90's of last
century. This systematically arranged set of principles, standards, best practices or
recommendations is universally considered the basis of comparative study between
different systems of corporate governance.
As this is a comparative thesis, the comparative method, as form of the
sociological method, is the main methodology of this thesis. The term "comparative
method" refers to social scientific analysis concerning "observation in more than
one social system, or the same social system at more than one point in time".8 In
other words, comparative sociology concerns making generalizations about what is
true of all societies and what is true of one society at point in time and space.9 In
8 D. P. Warwick & S. Osherson, at 8.
9 R. Bendix, at 532.
7this thesis, I will draw the companson between the two systems of corporate
governance with regards to methodology. The thesis will compare the legal,
economic as well as political systems of corporate governance found in Canada and
in China. We will discuss the legal and institutional contexts, the legal, economic,
political and cultural literature of the two countries, seeking answers to questions
like these: What are divergences and convergence between the systems of corporate
governance in the two countries? How are national economic growth and corporate
governance related? What are the future developments of the two different systems
of corporate governance? Etc.
In considering the fine point of corporate governance in this way, theory,
history, doctrine, and politics are used in this thesis as a framework for discussing
and dispelling myths about the nature of the corporation, initiating corporate law
reform, and dealing with modern concerns about corporate governance.
Generally, the study of corporate governance has been performed at two levels
of analysis. At the firm level, governance structures refer to the mechanisms
intended align the interests of managers of a particular firm with those of its other
shareholders. At the macroeconomic level, the research work has put forward the
concept of "national system of corporate governance", thus focusing on the
influence of national legal and institutional frameworks upon managerial discretion.
This thesis will also focus on the two levels.
Two levels study method will also apply to the thesis. At the firm level, the
comparative study of firm corporate governance performances in the two countries
will be introduced; at the macro level, the economic and political background of
corporate governance and the legal framework will be touched.
8The Thesis
There is an immense magnitude of discussion on various aspects of corporate
governance in the academic field. The present study does not attempt to cover all of
these subjects with regards to the corporate governance. It will focus on comparing
two rather distinctive systems of corporate governance, with respect to three
specific aspects of the corporate governance. Those are: the board of directors, the
ownership structure, the roles of institutional investors as well as the stock
exchange in the two countries, also the reforms in China. Moreover, the divergence
and convergence ofthe two corporate governance systems will be introduced.
With respect to the issues at stake, I will touch on the general concept of
corporate governance, the origins and the features of Canadian and Chinese systems
of corporate, comparative study of the two systems of corporate governance.
Further, the divergence and convergence of the two systems of corporate
governance will be analyzed. The convergence in this study does not at all mean the
victory of one system of corporate governance over another, it means that the
corporations and investors are able to increasingly cooperate and trust each other
across the border, by respecting and learning from each other. In this thesis, we do
not intend to render a judgment as to which of the two systems is better in the context
of corporate performance and national capital markets. Instead, we choose to focus on a
set of corporate governance mechanisms and assess their divergence and convergence.
We also come up with overall governance advices based on the set of comparison.
The thesis is broken down into four parts excluding introduction and
conclusion. The definition of corporate governance raises the age-old question of
what a corporation is. This question is also central to corporate governance. The
general study of corporate governance is the subject of Part One, it includes the
theoretical basis of company and its corporate governance, the fashionable and
9somewhat ambiguous concept of corporate governance.]O It will also deal in depth
with the global institutional organization with regards to the corporate governance,
elements of the theory of firm as well as related theories of corporate governance as
an understanding of this correlation is a prerequisite for any further discussion on
corporate governance. The function of effective corporate governance in one
corporation will also be touched.
Corporate governance can not develop without the contribution of other
elements. The historical, economic, political and social factors are the very
important elements in the formation and development of a system of corporate
governance of one country. Culture is also a factor that significantly influences the
development of a corporate governance system.]] A II these elements make the
system of corporate governance in Canada and in China so distinctive. Part Two
introduces the specific features of corporate governance both in China and in
Canada. It includes the corporate environments, legal framework of corporate
governance, ownership structure, the board of directors as well as the role of
institutional investors in corporate governance, both in Canada and in China.
Part Three describes the comparison between Canadian corporate governance
system and Chinese corporate governance system with regards to legal framework,
recent development of corporate governance, and divergence. The foregoing
comparative analyses allow for a suitable model of corporate governance to be
deduced. However this kind of governance is merely in the theoretical and
hypothetical meaning and inevitably influenced by the author's values. The purpose
of the comparative analyses in this part is to provide a basic knowledge regarding
the two different systems ofcorporate governance and establish a foundation for the
10 For the discussion of this ambiguity see, K. Keasey, S. Thompson and M. Wright in the
introduction to Corporate Governance - Economic, Management and Financial Issues, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1997, at 2.
II See O. E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Transactional Relations
(1979) 22 Journal of Law and Economics at 239-242.
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ongoing analyses of possibilities and tendencies of convergence in the nest part. In
this context, the differences concerning origins and backgrounds of the Canadian
and Chinese systems of corporate governance will be discussed.
The development of corporate governance has shown some empirical
evidences for gradual integration of different systems. In recent years, the corporate
governance development in different systems has been moving to convergence. Part
Four is the simple and more difficult task which utilizes the results of the
comparison in Part Three to present the possibilities and empirical evidences of the
convergence of the Canadian and Chinese systems of corporate governance. Some
thoughts about various outstanding barriers to the convergence of different systems
corporate governance will also be introduced.
Finally, the thesis concludes that the convergence between two systems of
corporate governance means neither the victory of one system over another, nor the
uniformity of corporate governance norms and behaviors. Even the possibilities and
evidences of convergence, divergent corporate structures and governance will still
tend to persist. Either Canadian system or Chinese system of corporate governance
will keep or evolve into its own model reflecting the country's traditions, values. It
is hoped that this thesis will illustrate the importance of corporate governance in
discussions to the two countries, as well as providing a starting point for a larger
inquiry into the nature of the corporation and its place in society, especially for the
China's economic reform in the transaction era.
PART ONE: FRAMEWORK: LEGAL THEORY, DEFINITION AND
MECHANISMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
The concept of firm can be traced back to Roman law, but it was not used as a
common business vehicle until the nineteenth century. CA. Cooke, wrote in 1950, 'In
less than three hundred years the social institution connoted by the words "company"
and "corporation" has undergone mutations in form and application which placed it
among the most influential of social groupings' .12
1. Theories ofCorporation
The concept of corporation can be traced back to Roman law, but it was not used
as a common business vehicle until the nineteenth century. The modern corporate
systems were built by the earliest industrial countries on a common foundation and
had a fundamental similarity.13 There is a fundamental difference in legal structure
between the traditional firm and modern incorporation. While the first consists of a
single ownership relation between owners and assets, the latter consists of two
overlapping ownership relations, including: the relation between shareholders and the
corporation, and the relation between the corporation and corporate assets. The latter
legal relation is indirect and exists only through the intermediary of the corporation
that performs the dual role ofa thing and a person.
Corporate structures depend in part on the structures a country had in earlier
times, in particular the structures with which the economy started. 14 Thes e structures
12 C. A. Cooke, Corporate, Trust and Company - An Essay in Legal History, Manchester University
Press, Manchester, 1950, at 7.
13 See P. I. Blumberg, The multinational Challenge to Corporation Law, The Search for a New
Corporate Personality. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) at 3.
14 Bebchuk LA and Roe MJ A Theory ofPath Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance
12
also bias the legal rules in terms of what is efficient in any given country and the
interest group politics which determine which rules are chosen.1 5
There are various theories and many arguments with regards to the nature and
origins of corporation. Only a few have stood the test of time and evolved as currently
influential. So far, the academic field has not yet provided a satisfactory theory.
Various theories interact and influence each other.
1. The Nature of Corporation
We may hold that the legal doctrine which sees in the corporation a distinct
person is contrary to truth and fact; then a supplementary question will be: what is the
truth which the doctrine veils and obscures? Or we may ask further: of what nature
the distinctive person, which appears in the corporate holding of rights?16 From these
views, the nature of corporate existence can be concluded the fiction theory from the
first case; and the organic theoryl? from the second case.
a). Fiction Theory18
The fiction theory can be traced to the canon law of the Roman church ofthe 13th
century and earlier. With this theory, corporations are simply legal fictions, created
and sustained by an act of the state.19
The fiction theory asserts that the legal person has no substantial reality, no mind,
(1999) 52 Stanford L Rev, at 127;
15 Ibid
16 Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations, (Kitchener: Batoche Books Limited, 2000; also
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1897), at 9.
17 The organic theory is sometimes referred to as the "real entity" theory or "natural entity" theory
18 It is sometimes suggested that there is separate theory which sees the corporate merely as an
aggregate of individuals; but this is really the corollary of the fiction theory, for if the corporation is a
legal fiction, which will leave the people involved with it as merely an aggregate of individuals.
19 Stokes, M. "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Twining, W. (ed). Legal Theory and the Common
Law. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, 155, 162
13
no will; it exists only in law. It regards a corporation as a creation of law, and
presumes that it is an artificial or fictional creature, possessing only those properties
and rights that are conferred upon it by law or are incidental to its existence. It is a
theory which asserts that the corporate body is merely a creature of the intellect.20
This theory thinks that the legal conception of a corporation cannot be reconciled with
fundamental truth and logic; it has no basis in the reality of facts. It is a fiction
adopted for the purpose of deducing rights and obligations which could not be
deduced with equal facility from a conception corresponding to the true nature of
h· 21t mgs.
This theory forms the basis of the fiction that corporations are persons that they
possess the legal rights they do, such as private property rights. However the fiction
theory affords no basis for the recognition of moral rights of corporations. On the
fiction view, "corporations, as creatures of the State, have only those rights granted
them by the State.,,22
b). Organic Theory
The organic theory views a corporation as a real being in society, irrespective of
whether or not the law recognizes it. In this theory, corporation has been seen as a
social organism with a real life, like a human being with a physical body. Martin
Wolff pointed out in his article that "the subjects of rights need not be human beings,
that every beings which possesses a will and life of its own may be the subject of
rights and that States, corporations, foundations are beings just as alive and just as
capable of having a will as are human beings...Man uses his bodily organs for the
20 See John. Dewey The Historic Background ofCorporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926)
at 667. He pointed out that the fiction theory is ultimately a philosophical theory that the corporate
body is but a name, a thing of the intellect.
21 Ernst Freund, J. U. D. The Legal Nature ofCorporations, (Kitchener: Batoche Books Limited, 2000)
at 9.
22 First National Bank v Bellotti (1978) 435 US 765, 55 L Ed 2d 707, 778 (US) per Powell J,
characterizing the stated view as "extreme".
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purpose. Corporation use men".23 The rise of the organic theory of the corporation
was a major factor in legitimating big business and that none of the other theoretical
alternatives could provide as must sustenance to newly organized concentrated
enterprise.24
The organic theory is generally regarded as the work of 19th century German
realists, particularly professor Gierke,25 the most prominent representative of this
theory, saw corporate personality not merely as a juristic conception, but as a social
fact with an actual living nature. The function of law is to recognize and declare the
existence of the personality.26 The theory's basic flaw is that it treats an analogy with
a human being as the basic of a parallel reality, thus the approach does not solve the
issue of the nature ofthe corporation.27
2. Origins of Corporation
The arguments concerning the nature of corporation have relation with and
sometimes are confused with another separate issue, namely the origins of the
corporation. Two main theories had been developed with regard to the origins of
corporation, namely the concession theory and the contract theory.
a). Concession Theory
Concession theory, having its zenith of support in the mid-nineteenth century,
sees the corporation as having granted its identity by concession of the State. What the
23 See Martin Wolff, On the Nature ofLegal Persons (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review, at 498.
24 See Morton 1. Horwitz, SANTA CLARA Revisited: The Development ofCorporate Theory, 88 W. Va.
L. Rev. 173 (1985), at 176.
25 Das Deutsche Genossenschajisreche (1887). Translated in O. Gierke Political Theories of the
Middle Age (F.W. Maitland (ed.),
26 Ernst Freund, The Legal Nature of Corporations, (Kitchener: Batoche Books Limited, 2000; also
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1897), at 13.
27 See Martin Wolff, On the Nature ofLegal Persons (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review, at 498.
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concession theory must insist upon is that its legal power is derived.28 The essence of
this theory is that the corporation's legal power is derived from the state.
Concession theory holds that corporation, as an artificial entity, whose separate
legal personality is granted as a privilege by the state.29 There are two ideas in the
concession theory. First, the notion that the corporation is an artificial or fictional
entity exists "only in the contemplation of law.,,3o The second element is that the
corporation is "an emanation of the state, created by revocable grant.,,31
b). Contract Theory
Corporation is an association formed by the agreement of its shareholders.32 The
contract theory sees the corporation is no different from the partnership, because the
corporate structure is the outcome of a series of contracts between the shareholders
and the managers.33 That is to say, this theory emphasizes that the corporation is, in
reality, a private arrangement of individuals contracting with each other. A modern
version of the doctrine has recently developed to view a corporation simply as a
"nexus of contracts".34 In the nexus of contracts view, the firm "is just a legal fiction
which serves as a focus for the complex process in which the conflicting objectives of
individuals ... are brought in equilibrium within a framework of contractual
28 John. Dewey The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 Yale L.J. 655 (1926) at
668
29 Stokes, M. "Company Law and Legal Theory" in W. Twining (ed.), Legal Theory and Common
Law (1986) at162.
30 Yaron, G. Awakening Sleeping Beauty: Reviving Lost Remedies and Discourses to Revoke
Corporate Charters, (LL.M. Thesis, University of British Colombia, 2000) at 2 I which cited from
Chris Tollefson, Theorizing Corporate Constitutional Rights: Revisiting 'Santa Clara' Revisited (LL.M.
Thesis, York University, 1992) at 13 citing Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819) at
636 (per Marshall Ch. J.).
31 Ibid
32 See Morton J. Horwitz, SANTA CLARA Revisited: The Development ofCorporate Theory, 88 W. Va.
L. Rev. 173 (1985), at 203, which attributes the theory to a work by V. Morawetz A treatise on the Law
ofPrivate Corporations 2nd edn (Boston, MA: Little, rown, 1886).
33 See Ben Pettet, Company Law (Pearson Education Limited, 2001) at 54.
34 Jensen & Meckling, Theory of The Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J.Fin. ECON. 305 (1976).
16
relationship".35 A ccording to this theory, each party of corporation is fully protected
by its contract, with the exception of the shareholders, who accept a residual payoff
because they have a comparative advantage in diversifying risk. As a result,
shareholders need the protection ensured by control.
The contract theory maintains the fictitious entity element of concession theory.
However, it discards the notion of incorporation as a matter of privilege, rather
viewing the creation of the corporation as a contractual arrangement between
individuals.36
IL Definition ofCorporate Governance
The term "corporate governance" has no universally accepted definition, but
instead, experts in the area have subjected its boundaries to different prescription?7
Generally, corporate governance is susceptible to both broad and narrow definitions.
The classic and simplest definition of corporate governance as defined by the Cadbury
Report is: "The system by which companies are directed and controlled for the benefit
of shareholders." The term "corporate governance" appears to have arisen and entered
into prominent usage in the late 1970's in the United States in the wake of the
Watergate scandal and the discovery that major American corporations had engaged in
secret political contributions at home and corrupt payments abroad.38
35 Jensen M. C., and W. Meckling. 1976. "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure." Journal Of Financial Economics 3: 305-360. at 312.
36 GI L YARON, AWAKENING SLEEPING BEAUTY: REVIVING LOST REMEDIES AND
DISCOURSES TO REVOKE CORPORATE CHARTERS (LL.M. Thesis, University of British
Colombia, 2000) at 22.
37 Enoch Larbi Aboagye, Debt Financing: An Emerging Influence on Corporate Governance? (LL.M.
Thesis, McGill University, 2001) at 17, citing Brian R. Cheffins, Teaching Corporate Governance
(1999) 19 Legal Studies 515 at 517.
38 E. Norman Veasey, The Emergence of Corporate Governance as a New Legal Discipline, 48 The
Business Lawyer. 1276 (1993). Also see Henry 1. Braker, Corporate Governance, Culture and
Convergence: Corporations American Style or with a European Touch? presented at the conference on
"Transatlantic Perspectives on US - EU Economic relations: Convergence Cooperation and Conflict",
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Since its emergence, corporate governance has increasingly succeeded in
attracting public attention because of its importance for the corporate performance
and society development. However, due to its potential extensive coverage of
different economic phenomena, the corporate governance is poorly defined so far. A
few of the different definitions rather than just one should be introduced here
depending on different perspectives for understanding the definition of corporate
governance
Generally, Corporate Governance is a set of systems and processes for ensuring
proper accountability, probity and openness in the conduct of a corporation. The
OECD provides the most authoritative functional definition ofcorporate governance:
"[c]orporate governance is the system by which business corporations
are directed and controlled. The corporate governance structure specifies
the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants
in the corporation, such as the board, managers, shareholders and other
stakeholders, and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions
on corporate affairs. By doing this, it also provides the structure through
which the company objectives are set, and the means of attaining those
objectives and monitoring performance.,,39
The definition in the preamble of the OECD principles 40 encompasses:
"Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a company's
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate
Governance also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company
are set, and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performances are
determined."
According to the World Bank Group, corporate governance is about maximizing
April 11-12,2002, hosted by the John F. Kennedy School ofGovemment, Harvard University.
39 OECD April 1999. OECD's definition is consistent with the one presented by Cadbury (1992, page
15).
40 OECD principles provides a standard framework to analyze corporate governance practices. These
principles acknowledge not only the importance of legal protection, but also of other mechanisms of
corporate governance. The principles are structured in 5 categories that look at shareholders rights,
board responsibilities and disclosure of information among others.
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value subject to meeting a corporation's financial and other legal and contractual
obligations. This inclusive definition stresses the need for boards of directors to
balance the interests of shareholders with those of other stakeholders such as
employees, customers, suppliers, investors and creditors, in order to achieve
long-term sustained value.
Corporate governance is defined as the system by which companies are directed,
controlled and evaluated. Corporate governance should affect every area of
management of a corporation. It includes the review and approval of plans of action,
corporate objectives, internal control systems and the engaging of regular
management performance reviews. It also encompasses the timeliness and accuracy of
d· I 41corporate ISC osure.
In academic field, scholars have defined corporate governance from different
perspectives. The different views on corporate governance can also be related to their
different cultural contexts, intellectual backgrounds and interests. There is often little,
or incomplete integration between the different disciplines. The overlap of corporate
governance with other disciplines is rarely articulated or even recognized.
For some from the financial perspective, such as Anfrei Shleifer and Robert W.
Vishny, corporate governance "deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.,,42 Demb and
Neubauer (1992) state, "Corporate governance is the process by which corporations
are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders.,,43
Tricker (1994) states from stakeholder perspective that corporate governance
addresses the issues facing the Board of Directors, such as the interaction with top
41 This quotation is taken from a discussion of corporate governance to be found at the website of the
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan, at www.otpp.com
42 Shleifer and Vishny The Journal ofFinance, (1997, page 737).
43 Demb,A. and Neubauer, F. F., The corporate Board: Confronting the paradoxes, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press 1992).
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management, and relationship with the owners and others interested in the affairs of
the company, including creditors, debt financiers, analysts, auditors and corporate
regulators. Such wider concerns reflect the audience for company financial reports,
consistent with both Trickers' accounting background and the target audience for his
publication.44
Monks and Minow (1995) have an interest in 'relationship investing' as described
by Monks (1994).45 They wrote that 'Corporate governance is the relationship among
various participants in determining the direction and performance of corporations.
Their definition ofcorporate governance is based on 'relationships' as quoted earlier.
Different entities and experts necessitate consideration of different perspectives
and priorities on corporate governance. However, in a wide sense, corporate
governance includes "the entire network of formal and informal relations involving
the corporate sector and their consequences for society in general.,,46 Every country
tends to approache corporate governance from the background of its own distinctive
culture.47 F rom the beginning of corporate practice, China has constantly adopted
corporate forms and practices from both the Angle-Saxon system and
Continental-German system. For example, it imports two types of companies that are
indicative of Angle-Saxon system; it also adopts the two-tier board structure of
Continental-European system. Chinese definitions of corporate governance in the
study tend to cover the system regulating relationships among all parties with interests
in a business organization, usually spelling out shareholders as a particularly
important group.
44 Tricker, R.I., International Corporate Governance, (Singapore: Simon & Schuster, 1994)
45 Monks, R.A.G. 1994, 'Relationship Investing', Corporate Governance: An International Review,
vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 58-76
46 See K.Keasey, S,Thompson and M. Wright in the introduction to Corporate Governance -
Economic, Management and Financial Issues, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1997. at 2.
47 John H. Farra, Corporate Governance in Australia and New Zealand, (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2001), at 3.
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Canada's geographic proximity to US has determined that its system of corporate
governance would inevitably close to the Anglo-Saxon model. However, Canada's
corporate governance does not resemble that of US. As a result, Canadian corporate
law adopts different approaches to regulate issues such as shareholder litigation and
markets' securities. In Canada, corporate governance is defined as:
«Corporate governance» means the process and structure used to
direct and management the business and affaires of the corporation with
the objective of enhancing shareholder value, which includes ensuring the
financial viability of the business. The process and structure define the
division of power and establish mechanisms for achieving accountability
among shareholders, the board of directors and management. The
direction and management of business should take into account the impact
on other stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and
communities.48
III. Theories ofCorporate Governance
The standard agency theory of corporate governance focuses on the separation of
ownership and control and investigates the mechanisms via which the suppliers of
capital - diffuse and concentrated debt and equity holders - influence managerial
decisions with varying degrees of success.49 0 n this view, the key function of
corporate law is to devise strategies and mechanisms to ensure that those who are in
control of the shareholders' property use it strictly for the shareholders' benefit.50 As
the various definitions of corporate governance presented by different institutions and
scholars, there are various theories of corporate governance. A summary of the
various theories of corporate governance that have been developed over the last
48 Toronto Stock Exchange Committee, Where were the directors?, Report of the Toronto Stock
Exchange Committee on Corporate governance in Canada, Toronto, 1994, p,7. (Dey report).
49 Shleifer and Vishny, 1997
50 Terry O'Neill, The Patriarchal Meaning of Contract: Feminist Reflections on Corporate
Governance Debate, in Fiona Macmillan, ed., Perspectives on Company Law, Vol. 2, (The
Hague-London-Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 27.
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century are useful in this context in order to fully understand how the different
cultural and economic factors influence the corporate governance; and enable us to
critically analyze the move to general principles on corporate governance.
However, the modem theory of corporate governance IS challenging the
traditional corporate doctrine which has taken the separation of ownership from
control as the core problem of corporate governance. Dodd has argued that the
modem corporation should be seen as existing for the benefit of society generally, and
that the board of directors should have the board description to manage the
corporation for the benefit of al1.51 The directors' fiduciary duties are owned to the
corporation and to the corporation alone and not to any particular member.52 This
thesis summarizes and subsequently analyzes the two theories of corporate
governance in the world today. They are contractarian model and communitarian
model. The first one is shareholder-oriented model which means that the shareholder's
interest comes first, and managers should be accountable primarily to the shareholder;
the second one is stakeholder-oriented model. Even if we assume a
shareholder-oriented model is the most efficient system because it reduces capital
costs, scholars continue to argue that there are certain path dependent forces that may
prevent a country from developing a dispersed-ownership model despite market
pressure.
1. Contractarian Model
The contractarian model of corporate governance is generally followed by the
Anglo-Saxon system of corporate governance. There are many benefits to this model,
such as efficiency and innovation. The central principles of contractarianism are to
51 See E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees? (1932) 45 Harv. L. Rev.at
1145.
52 See L. C. B. Gower, Principles ofModern Company Law, 5th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1992)
at 55 I.
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give its view of the corporation as a nexus of contracts,53 voluntary agreements and
market forces. Accordingly, this schematic relies on law and public policy to protect
freedom of contract.54 In recent years it has become common for both economic and
legal theorists to view a corporation as a 'nexus of contracts', explicit and implicit.55
The Canadian model can be described as a model of shareholder-oriented and is
premised on the firm as a nexus of contracts. It operates through contracts between
the employees, shareholders, and management, seeking maximum profit. The firm is
described as a nexus of contracts, a legal fiction. This is a very financial view of the
firm and its function.
2. Communitarian Model
The theory of communitarians, with the view of the corporation as a separate
entity with rights and responsibilities as a natural person, is becoming increasingly
recognized and now serve as an alternative to the contractarian position.56
Different from contractarian model which is rooted in assumptions of utilitarian
and methodological individualism, communitarian model finds its roots in humanism
and methodological holism.57 In the communitarian model, the firm is not considered
as an economic aggregation of individuals but rather as an entity, connected in some
53 In 1976 Michael Jensen and William Meckling first formulated the conception that the corporation is
a nexus of contracts in their famous article The Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs, and Ownership Structure. 3 1. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
54 See Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. Walsh, The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads,
62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, 11 (1999). At 40.
55 The idea that a firm is a "nexus of contracts" is usually traced to Alchian & Demsetz. See Armen A.
Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Jriformation Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM.
ECON. Rev. 777 (1972).
56 M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and J. Walsh" The Purposes and Accountability of the
Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads (1999) Law and
Contemporary Problems, at 17.
57 See Antonin Wagner, Communitarianism: A New Paradigm of Socioeconomic Analysis, 24 1.
SOCIO-ECON. 593, 598 (1995)
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organic fashion with our social, historical, and political world, ask how economic
activity serves society.58 A multifiduciary duty to not only the shareholders, but to all
of the firm's stakeholders is the manager's duty under communitarian theory. That is
to say, the corporate managers' duties should be seen as owned to the corporation as
an institution, rather than to the shareholders alone.59 Responsibility is emphasized in
the communitarian model, while the norms of freedom is more important in the
contractarian model. The Communitarian theory argues that liability rules and judicial
review are necessary to constrain the behavior of corporate managers. Without legal
constraints, it is feared that management will be accountable neither to stockholders
nor to society in general.60 Under communitarian theory, firms are guided to be more
community-conscious and called to pursue community (stakeholder) -oriented instead
of shareholder-oriented model.
3. Implication of the Contractarian and Communitarian Theory in Canadian
and Chinese perspectives
As the Canadian and Chinese systems of corporate governance contain elements
of both the contractarian and the communitarian theories, in the following discussion,
the implication of these two theories on the development of Canadian and Chinese
systems of corporate governance will be briefly outlined.
Before the decision of Peoples Department Stores v. Wise, Canadian courts and
legislatures had demonstrated a preference for the contractarian theory, which holds
that the corporation is a nexus of contracts, and that firm managers should prioritize
58 See Michael Bradley, Cindy A. Schipani, Anant K. Sundaram & James P. Walsh, The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a Crossroads.
62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 9, II (1999). At 42.
59 See A.A. Berle, The Twentieth Century Capitalist Revolution (New York, Harcout, 1954), at 169.
60 See M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and J. Walsh (1999), p. 35. citing Victor Brudney,
Corporate Governance. Agency Costs. and the Rhetoric ofContract, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1403, 1409
(1985); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L. 1.
663,663-72 (1974).
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its contract with its shareholders, governing the corporation so as to maximize
shareholder wealth.61 Sha reholders' interests alone should be the focus of managers'
duties.62 However, in the decision in the case of Peoples Department Stores v. Wise,
the Supreme Court of Canada's rejection of shareholder primacy is couched as an
endorsement of a doctrine already established in Canada before this case.63 F rom this
case, the corporation's interests should be read not simply as the shareholders'
interests. It can be concluded that prior to Peoples, Canadian system of corporate
governance was deeply influenced by contractarian theory; since People,
communitarian theory influences the Canadian system of corporate governance.
Originated from the old Confucianism which has influenced China for thousands
years and generally referred to as Asian values, communitarian theory distinguishes
itself from the contractarian theory identified with individualism and liberal
democracy.64 Chines e system of corporate governance is deeply influenced by
communitarian spirit which transpired in the historical experience of East Asian
countries strongly indicates that corporate management can be more long-term
minded. Under communitarian theory, the firm is a legal entity which has limited
liability and various constitutional protections.65 Th at is to say, China is often viewed
as a "stakeholder" model of corporate governance. The ownership of Chinese
companies is highly concentrated. Banks, sometimes also the state are argued to
provide most long-term external corporate finance, act as stable shareholder and
protect companies against hostile takeovers.
61 See the abstract of Lori Charvat, Promises and Challenges of Internal Dispute Resolution in the
Corporate Workplace, (LL.M. University ofBritish Columbia 2002).
62 See reck Corp. Ltd v. Millar, (1973),33 D.L.R. (3d) 288. and Parke v. Daily News Ltd (1962) 1 Ch.
927 (ChD.).
63 See Peoples Department Stores v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68 (October 29, 2004). Also see Lan B. Lee,
Peoples Department Store v. Wise and the "Best interests of the Corporation" 41 Canadian Business
Law Journal 212-222 (2005)
64 For details, see De Bary, William Theodore. (1998). Asian values and human rights: A Confucian
communitarian perspective. Harvard University Press.
65 See M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and J. Walsh (1999), p. 18.
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I~ Essential Principles for Good Corporate Governance
The national governments and the global or regional organizations are serious in
moving towards establishing good corporate governance. Various laws, rules, reports
and principles had been enacted over the past years to control, regulate and facilitate
corporate affairs, thus to create suitable environment for good corporate governance.
Good corporate governance is valuable not only to shareholders, but also to
governments and listed companies themselves. Corporate governance is strongly
related to a firm's potential market value. Research concluded that corporate
governance practices can have a powerful effect on market value in countries with
weak legal and cultural constraints on corporate behavior. 66 Other research has
shown that the quality of corporate governance influences firms' cost of capital, as
well the size and vibrancy of a country's capital markets.67
The principles of corporate governance have been stipulated and prescribed by
various company laws and organizations. However, from the view of the practices of
corporate development, better corporate governance should have the following
common elements:
1. Accountability & Responsibility
Generally, the essence of accountability is described as an obligation to present
an account of and answer for the execution of responsibilities to those who entrusted
those responsibilities.68 A ccountability belongs to an important category of social
66 See Black, B. (2001) The corporate governance behavior and market value of Russian firms.
Emerging Markets Review 2.
67 See Garten, 1. (2002) Corporate standards: raise the bar around the world. BusinessWeek, May 13, p.
30.
68 See Gray, Alan (1998), Management. Accountability and Public Sector Reform. in Boyle, Richard
and McNamara, Tony (eds.), Governance and Accountability - Power and Responsibility in the Public
Service. (Dublin: Institute of Public Administration).
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norms that may collectively be called "norms of governance,,69. Norms of governance
prescribe legitimate modes of wielding power-that is, they deal with use and abuse
of power. Accountability means that the Board of Directors is accountable to the
shareholders, and the management is accountable to the Board of Directors. It
includes the elaboration of the board of directors' responsibilities, aggrandizement of
directors' loyalty, assurance of the supervision and control of board of directors to the
managerial staffs.
An effective supervision and control mechanism can prevent misuse of power,
facilitate timely management response to change, and ensure that business risks are
preventively and effectively managed. With accountability and responsibility,
managers and controlling shareholders view their stewardship of the firm not as an
entitlement but rather as a privilege that must be constantly earned through excellent
performance and results.
2. Fairness
Protection of shareholder rights is a primary aim of corporate governance.
Shareholders especially minority and foreign shareholders need to be assured that
their assets are well protected against fraud, managerial or controlling shareholder
self-dealing and insider wrongdoing. In this regard, the good corporate governance
protects the rights of shareholders and ensures the equitable treatment of all
shareholders, including minority and foreign shareholders. All shareholders should
have the opportunity to obtain effective redress for violations of their rights. Fairness
is important for a corporation to perform well. However, good corporate governance
is not simply about fairness in the allocation of a limited fruits of a corporation but
rather about the enlargement of those fruits. Corporations that adopt fairness will have
a strong and sustained impetus to perform well and create value for the long term.
69 Behn, Robert. Rethinking Democratic Accountability. Brookings Institution, 2001, at 5
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With fairness, the fruits of the corporation's endeavors are equitably shared by all, in
accordance with the risks taken and the efforts extended by the various stakeholders
of the corporation.
3. Transparency and Disclosure
It would not be an exaggeration to point out that accounting is the soul of
corporate governance because without accounting, corporate management cannot be
monitored and corporate performance cannot be assessed in today's situation where
companies are facing the challenge of operating in a transparent and global
marketplace. Greater transparency acts as a driving force for enhancing corporate
accountability. Shareholders demand that companies offer them more complete,
credible, comparable and verifiable information regarding corporate performance.
Transparency means explaining Company's policies and actions to those to whom
it has responsibilities. Therefore transparency must lead to maximum appropriate
disclosures without jeopardizing the Company's strategic interests. Internally,
transparency means openness in Company's relationship among its board of directors,
executive staffs, shareholders and employees, as well as the conduct of its business in
a manner that will bear scrutiny. Corporate transparency has three main elements: 1)
corporate reporting (voluntary and mandatory), 2) information dissemination via the
media and Internet channels, and 3) private information acquisition and
communication by financial analysts, institutional investors, and corporate insiders.7o
With transparency, there is little room for sweeping problems under the rug,
making imperative prompt corrective actions when performance falters. In the fast
changing world of business, this can spell the difference between survival and
70 Bu shman, R., 1. Piotroski, and A. Smith. 2001. "What Determines Corporate Transparency?"
Unpublished paper. Quoted from Robert M Bushman, Abbie J Smith, Transparency, financial
accounting information, and corporate governance, Economic Policy Review - Federal Reserve Bank
ofNew York. New York: Apr 2003. Vol. 9, Iss. I; pg.65
continuing decline.
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PART Two: SPECIFIC FEATURES OF CANADIAN AND CHINESE
SYSTEMS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
I Overview ofCanadian and Chinese Corporate Environments
1. Types of Firm
a). Canada
In Canada, firms are free to organize under the laws of federation and any
province. Generally to say, there are three forms of business organization in Canada:
sole proprietorships, partnerships, and corporation.
An unincorporated business owned by one person is called a sole proprietorship.
The owner also acts as the manager of firm. From a legal viewpoint, the owners of
such unincorporated business are held personally liable for any and all debts of their
businesses. The partnership is a form of business organization other than a corporation
existing between two or more persons with the view to profit. One significant feature
of a partnership is that a partnership is not a separate legal entity in itself but merely a
voluntary association of individuals. Neither proprietorships nor partnerships are
entities separate from the owners as individuals.
Corporations are different from proprietorship and partnership in the sense that
they are legally distinct entities under legal system. Corporations can be created under
federal, provincial or special laws in Canada. The owners of a corporation are called
shareholders as they are entitled to share the profits of business. The following four
types of corporation can be found in Canadian corporations including privately held
corporations7!, publicly held corporations72 , crown corporations73 , and Non-profit
71 Privately held corporations are those whose shares do not traded on public exchanges and are
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With regard to the corporate governance issues in the context of fiduciary
obligations of the separation of ownership and management in this thesis, we
concentrate thereafter on the corporation as such, and more particularly on
publicly-held corporations.
b). China
China's current corporate system is in the process of corporatization reform. The
reform program envisions distinct forms of the modern enterprise system applicable
to State-owned enterprises (SOES).75 Large SOEs may be transformed into either of
the following two forms: Limited Liability Company and Joint Stock Company.76
Limited Liability Companies do not issue shares to the public. They remam
wholly-owned by one or more state shareholders. This form of organization is
appropriate for "corporations producing special categories of goods and enterprises
producing armaments."n According to the 1994 Company Law, each shareholder is
liable toward the company to the extent of its respective capital contribution.
therefore not subject to securities legislation.
72 Publicly held corporations are the main trend of Canadian firms and the main focus of this thesis.
The characteristics of Canadian publicly held corporations compared with the other types can be
summarized four aspects: limited liability, a legal personality distinct from and which survives its
individual owners, the need for centralized management of a large enterprise, and the need to raise
capital in public markets.
73 Crown corporation is the Canadian terms for a company whose shareholder is the government (the
"Crown") itself.
74 Non-profit corporation and foundations are entities with a social purpose that nevertheless operated
by most of the rules of marketplace.
75 According the company law, a state-owned enterprise is not a company. If a state-owned enterprise
is to be reorganized into a company, it must, in accordance with the conditions and requirements
prescribed by national statutes and administrative regulations, change its operating mechanism, and
orderly identify and verify its assets, determine the respective owners of the property rights therein,
settle its creditor's rights and liabilities, conduct assets appraisal, and set up standard internal
management organs. See article 7 of company law of China.
76 Also the article 2 of company law of China prescribes that a company means a limited liability
company or a joint stock limited company established within China.
77 Gao, Shangquan, and Fulin Chi. Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises. (Beijing: Foreign
Languages Press, I997), p. 32.
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Joint Stock Companies include a combination of state and public ownership.
During the corporatization process, the company's total capital is divided into equal
shares, which are then distributed to various shareholders. Each shareholder is liable
toward the company to the extent of their respective shareholdings.
Despite of the stipulation concerning the company in the company law, in China,
the enterprise concept covers a broader scope than company. Many of the operations
generally known as enterprises have existed beyond the scope of company law.
Although a number of entities may use the term "company" or "incorporation" in
their names, in a legal sense many of them are state-owned enterprises. With the
process of corporatization reform, this phenomenon should be changed.
2. Legal Framework of Corporate Governance
a). Legal Framework in Canada
Company law and the legal system play a key role in corporate governance.
Company law lays down the "rules of the game" for the internal operation of the
corporation including such important issues as the nature of shareholder rights and
duties, the organizational structure of the corporation, etc. The legal system is
important for corporate governance not only insofar as it plays am important role in
the enforcement of company law, but also to the extent that it is charged of
enforcement of a wide range of contracts which corporations make with various
external actors (e.g., suppliers, partners injoint ventures, etc.).
The Constitution of Canada grants both provinces and federation the power to
regulate corporations. According to the Constitution Act 1982, each province has the
right to make law in relation to the creation of companies that intend to operate within
the boundary of the particular province.
The key legislations with regard to Canadian corporate governance are the
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business corporation acts of the federal and provincial parliaments78 and, for publicly
traded companies, the securities acts of the various provinces. In addition, there are a
variety of other statutes that impose duties on corporate directors and thus have an
impact on corporate governance. The most important of these are the laws relating to
employment standards (provincial), environment (provincial and federal), and
insolvency (federal). Statutes governing certain sectors, such as banking, insurance
and telecommunications impose further obligations.
Besides the federal and provincial legislation concerning the corporate
governance, other corporate governance codes and principles in Canada include:
Corporate Governance Policy - New Disclosure Requirements and Amended
Guidelines; 79 Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture (Saucier
Report);8o Five Years to the Dey;81 Where Were The Directors? Guidelines for
Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (The Toronto Report). 82 Th ese codes
and principles will be introduced in the following chapters.
In Canada, corporate legislation has historically been strongly influenced by the
example of U.K. As a result of this, shareholders have in principle enjoyed many of
the same legal rights as shareholders in other Angle-Saxon countries despite of the
concentration of ownership in Canadian forms. Canada uses US law and practice as a
model for its corporate reform. However, Canada's corporate legal framework does
not resemble that of US. As a result, Canadian corporate legal framework adopts
78 Federally, the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) is the principal statute, but the Canada
Corporations Act is often used for non-profit organizations, foundations and the like. All provinces
have their own parallel acts, such as the Ontario Business Corporations Act and the Quebec Companies
Act.
79 On March 26, 2002 the Board of Directors of the Toronto Stock Exchange approved amendments of
the corporate governance disclosure guidelines.
80 The Joint Committee on Corporate Governance (known as the '"Saucier Committee" for its chair,
Guylaine Saucier) issued its final report in November 2001.
81 Report on Corporate Governance, 1999
82 Toronto Stock Exchange published .. Where Were The Directors?" in 1994, which was a landmark
study on corporate governance. Since then, standards of corporate governance have improved in
boardrooms across Canada
33
different approaches to regulate matters such as shareholder litigation and securities
markets.
b). Legal Framework in China
The legal framework for corporate governance in China is based primarily on the
following national laws and regulations: the Certified Accountant Law (issued in
1993), Audit Law (1994), Company Law (1994), People's Bank ofChina Law (1995),
Commercial Bank Law (1995), Securities Law (1998), and Accounting Law (1999).
The key regulatory bodies involved in the lawmaking process are CSRC, the State
Economic and Trade Commission, the Ministry of Finance, and the People's Bank of
China. Since establishment of CSRC, more than 300 laws, regulations, rules,
standards, and guidelines concerning the securities and futures market have been
stipulated by the China legislative and administrative authorities. All these laws and
regulations form the fundamental framework of Chinese system of corporate
governance.
The importance of corporate governance has been recognized in the continuous
development of the Chinese capital market, the Chinese Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) recently issued two corporate governance requirements: Code of
Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China enacted by both the CSRC and
State Economic and Trade Commission in 2002 and Guidelines for Introducing
Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies issued by
CSRC in 2001.
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China is based on the
guideline issued by Shanghai Stock Exchange at the 2000 international conference on
corporate governance. It aims to introduce solid corporate governance in listed
companies by elevating requirements on accounting procedures and information
disclosure, introducing independent directors' systems, and tightening the supervision
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of corporate management. It stipulates the code of conduct of all the following parties
in the listed companies: shareholders and shareholders' meeting, directors and board
of directors, and the supervisors and the supervisory board. The code sets out both the
rules for establishing performance assessment and incentive and disciplinary systems
and the rules for disclosing information and maintaining transparency.83 In particular,
the stipulation with regard to the listed company in which the controlling shareholder
owns a stake in excess of 30 percent should adopt a cumulative voting mechanism to
ensure the voting interests of minority shareholders.84
China's Company Law of 1994 follows the old Continental style of company
legislation. According to the Company Law,85 there are three tiers of control over
corporate operations: the shareholders' general meeting, the boards of directors and
supervisory board, and management. The general shareholders' meeting has final
right over the key issues of the corporation, such as approval of the management
strategy, the financial budget and key investment plans, and the nomination of the
boards of directors and supervisors. The board of directors makes key investment
plans and the supervisory board oversees the decision-making process and
performance of senior management and directors. And management is responsible for
corporate operations and for implementing the decisions of the board of directors.
83 See Ruyin Hu, Shareholder Rights and the Equitable Treatment ofShareholders, The Fourth Asian
Roundtable on Corporate Governance of OECD. At http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/11/2484867.pdf
(access date: Feb. 25,2004)
84 See article 31 of Code ofCorporate Governancefor Listed Companies in China
85 F or an assessment of the company law see Ong, Kingsley, and Colin Baxter. (1999). "A
Comparative Study of the Fundamental Elements of Chinese and English Company Law."
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48(January): 88-126; Nicholas C. Howson, "China's
Company Law: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back? A Modest Complaint" 11:1 Columbia Journal of
Asian Law 127 (1997); Png Cheong Ann, "Some concerns about Chinese company law", 17(7)
Company Lawyer 199 (1996); Liu, Lawrence s. "Chinese Characteristics Compared: A Legal and
Policy Perspective of Corporate Finance and Governance in Taiwan and China" at ssrn.com
(http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/delivery.cfm/delivery.cfm/SSRN ID273174 codeO I061 2560.pdf?abstracti
d=273174 access date: Apr. 26, 2004).
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II Ownership Structure of Canadian Corporations and Chinese
Corporations
The ownership structure is an important component of corporation governance,
the corporate world today subdivides into rival systems of dispersed and concentrated
ownership, each characterized by different corporate governance structures. 86 In
concentrated ownership structures, ownership and/or control is concentrated in the
hands of a small number of individuals, families, managers, directors, holding
companies, banks and/or other non-financial corporations. In dispersed ownership
structure, a large number of owners each hold a small number of company shares.
Small shareholders have little incentive to closely monitor a company's activities and
tend not to be involved in management decisions or policies. It is well known that
there are two different models in corporate governance: the bank based and the market
based model. The distinction Angle-Saxon model and Continental-European model
mostly corresponds to the distinction. In the Anglo-Saxon model, share ownership is
dispersed and unsatisfactory performance is sanctioned by shareholders selling shares
or by hostile takeovers. In the Continental-European model, core investors own
significant stakes. The more recent focus on ownership structure has been on two
issues. First, to compare the operation of market-based systems of corporate
governance, in which share-ownership is relatively dispersed and financial markets
playa major role in monitoring company performance, with "blockholder" systems,
in which most public companies have a controlling shareholder and banks playa more
significant role in corporate governance than financial markets. Many researchers
have already studied whether ownership structure significantly affects corporate
governance.87
86 John C. Coffee, Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market
Failure, 25 J. CORP. LA WI, 1-2 (1999).
87 See generaIly, M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and 1. Walsh, "The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a CrossRoads"
62(3) (1999) Law and Contemporary Problems 9.
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In this part, we examine the ownership structure of Canadian corporations and
Chinese corporations. On the one hand, a generalization within North America would
see different: the ownership structure of Canadian corporations does not follow the
feature of market based governance model characterized by widely held corporations;
the other part, the situation of core owner of state in a corporate is changing. On the
other hand, the ownership structure setting in China is quite different from the west
and from the countries of the former Soviet bloc. China has not, as was the case in the
former Soviet-bloc countries, undergone a rapid transition from a planned economy to
a market economy.88
1. Ownership Structure of Canadian Corporation
Canada's geographic proximity to the United States has determined that its
corporate law would inevitably move closer to the US model. For example, Canada
adopted a mandatory securities regime which is "very much American in concept and
approach".89 But there are some differences between the Canadian model and the
Anglo-Saxon model.
a). Concentrated Ownership
Like other Anglo-Saxon countries, Canada is a country characterized by an active
stock market. However, the main difference between Canadian system and the other
Anglo-Saxon countries (i.e. the United States) is that Canada has experienced a rapid
concentration of stock ownership in the hands of controlling shareholders. Although
some studies show that the ownership concentration of public companies in Canada
88 The inherent pragmatism of China's reform process is typified by the analogy used by Deng
Xiaoping in 1962 to refer to reform of the system of production. He used a popular Chinese saying, "It
does not matter if it is a white cat or a black cat as long as it catches mice." While this may have lacked
resonance in the 1960's (Deng was purged during the Cultural Revolution), it did not came to typify
until the 1978 economic reform. See Lan Cao, "The Cat that Catches Mice: China's Challenge to the
Dominant Privatization Model" (1995) 21 Brook. 1. Int '/ L 97.
89 See C. Jordan, International Survey of Corporate Law in Asia, Europe, North America and the
Commonwealth (Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation Faculty of Law, The University
of Melbourne, Melbourne, 1997), p. 32.
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has lessened in recent years,90 a significant number are still owned by a small group
of controlling shareholders. The fact is that the nature of corporate ownership
structure in Canada has changed significantly over the past decade with the
replacement of the retail investor by the institutional investor as the major player in
Canadian equity markets.91 Th at is to say, most Canadian companies do not have
dispersed shareholdings, and are usually controlled by a principal shareholder. In the
United States, large share holdings, and especially majority ownership, are relatively
. . 92
majorIty uncommon.
A Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration reported in 1978 that among
Canada's 100 largest non-financial corporations, 48% were either wholly owned or
controlled by a majority stockholder. 93 A later study in 1985 found that nine
Canadian families held control over 46% of the top 300 companies traded on Toronto
Stock Exchange.94 More recent data shows that 382 out of Canadian 400 largest
public corporations are controlled by a majority shareholder, and only 15 of the 100
largest corporations are widely held by numerous shareholders.95 The controlling
shareholders, through board representation, have a powerful influence on corporate
governance.96
90 R. Daniels & J. MacIntosh, "Toward a Distinctive Canadian Corporate Law Regime" (1991) 29
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 863; R. Daniels and P. Halpern, "The Role of the Closely Held Public
Corporation in the Canadian Economy and the Implications for Public Policy (1995) Can. Bus. L.J.
91 J.G. MacIntosh, "The Role of Institutional and Retail Shareholders in Canadian Capital Markets"
(1993) 32 Osgoode Hall L.J 371 at 411.
92 Probably due to legal restrictions on high ownership and exercise of control by banks, mutual funds,
insurance companies, and other institutions, the concentration of corporate ownership is uncommon.
For detailed, see Roe, Mark, 1994, Strong Managers Weak Ownership: The Political Roots ofAmerican
Corporate Finance (University Press, Princeton, N.J.).
93 See the Report ofthe Royal Commission on Corporate Concentration, 1978.
94 See D.A. DeMott, Comparative Dimensions of Takeover Regulation, in J.e. Jr. Coffee et al. eds.,
Knights, Raiders and Target: The Impact ofthe Hostile Takeover (New York: Oxfort University Press,
1988) at 398, 400.
95 R.A.G. Monks & N. Minow, Corporate Governance (Blackwell Business, Massachusetts, 1995), p.
39.
96 A review of 795 corporations listed on the TSE300 in 2000 found that 25% of companies had no
shareholder with more than 10% of all outstanding voting shares in the company; 52% of companies
had no shareholder with more than 20% of outstanding voting shares; and 77% had no shareholder with
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The concentration of corporate ownership is one of the main characteristics of
bank-based systems of corporate governance existing mainly in Europe. The effects of
ownership concentration on firm performance are theoretically complex and
empirically ambiguous. Conceptually, concentrated ownership may Improve
performance by increasing monitoring and alleviating the free-rider problem in
takeovers.97
This concentrated ownership results in some differences in Canadian corporate
governance and practice. The first difference is that the Canadian corporate
management does not need statutory discretion to operate a firm "because it has the
votes to change statutory default rules as it please".98 A detailed study of Roth..99
shows the relation between the ownership structure concentration and corporate
decision-making and performance. In the concentrated ownership companies, large
shareholders may help reduce the free-rider problem of small investors, and hence are
value-increasing in the econom ic hypothesis. 100 This concentrated nature of
ownership structure and control of Canadian public companies decreases the
likelihood of shareholder approval for any shareholder proposal to which a controlling
shareholder and management object. 101
more than 50% of voting shares. This, however, does not account for the cooperation of shareholders in
practice. The current data contrasts starkly with early studies that found in more than 3/4 of Canadian
corporations reviewed, one large blockholder controlled 20% or more of the voting shares, and in over
half of the firms a single blockholder controlled more than 50% of the voting shares. See William M.
MacKenzie, "Out of Control" (OctoberlNovember 2000) 12(6) Corporate Governance Review I at 2;
MacIntosh (1995-96), for detail.
97 Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny (1986), "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control."
Journal ofPolitical Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
98 R. Romano, The Genius ofAmerican Corporate Law (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1993), p.
124.
99 Roth.Chris W. Concentration of ownership and the composition of the board: An examination of
Canadian publicly-listed corporations, The Canadian Business Law Journal. Agincourt: Feb
1996. Vol. 26, Iss. 2; pg. 226.
100 See, Shleifer, A, and Vishny, R. W (1986), "Large Shareholders and Corporate Control." Journal of
Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
101 S. Rousseau, L'intluence des Investisseurs Institutionnels sur la Regie d'Entreprise au Canada,
(1996) 37, Les Cahiers de Droit Universite Laval 305-376, p. 329. cite PA Koval, "Trends in Canadian
Shareholder Activism" in The Canadian Institute, Duties and Liabilities of Officers and Directors,
Toronto. Canadian Institute Publication, 1992, 55-57.
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The concentration of ownership structure in Canada also affects the country's
corporate litigation patterns. Due to the power of controlling shareholders in Canadian
forms, unlike other Anglo-Saxon countries; Canadian law does not provide great
incentives for shareholder Iitigation. 102 Another difference is that there are provincial
securities laws respectively instead of one federal securities law in Canada.
b). Interconnected Corporate Relationships
Although Canada and the United States are economic identical in many ways,
Canadian corporate ownership structure differs radically from that of the United
States. Canada permits vast interconnected groups of corporations. Moreover,
Canadian large, interventionist government makes ties between business and political
insiders important. 103 Interconnected corporate relationship between the corporations
is another particularity of Canadian corporate ownership. Many corporations are
linked through ownership relationships. In the late 1980s, 5305 corporations were
already tied to each other. 104
2. Ownership Structure of Chinese Corporation
The success of Chinese economy depends on good performance and efficient
growth of the Chinese companies. Corporate success requires sufficient and proper
investment activity, which is largely made possible by expansion of opportunities for
raising equity capital through the capital market. All these depend on the terms and
conditions of corporate governance. However, all these successes do not mean that
successful system of corporate governance has been established in China. Chinese
102 R. Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law (The AEI Press, Washington, D.C., 1993), p.
126-127.
103 See Morek, R. It s Time for Canada to Distance Herself fi'om the Third World, at:
http://www.bus.ualberta.ca/rmorck/
104 See Burcu InaI, Corporate Governance in the United States, Canada and French, (LL.M. Thesis,
McGill University, 2000), p. 38, cited C.N. Sargent, Corporate Groups and the Corporate Veil in
Canada: A Penetrating Look at Parent-Subsidy Relations in the Modern Corporate Enterprises (1988)
17Man.L.J.156.
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system of corporate governance has its own characteristics. Chinese corporate
ownership structure has its own characteristics which are similar to and also different
from that of Canadian system in the following two aspects.
a). Assorted Ownership
In China, the ownership structure of listed companies consists of mainly state
ownership, legal persons' ownership and public ownership. This is quite different
from Canadian situation.
State ownership is the result of the share conversion process, and is represented
by the state asset management unit or their authorized agencies or investment
companies. Legal person ownership includes state-owned legal persons' ownership
and non state-owned legal person ownership that are not state owned. State owned
legal person ownership came about as a result of investment by state-owned
enterprises into joint stock companies. Non state-owned legal person ownership can
be divided further into "insider legal person ownership", and "outsider legal person
ownership". The former represents ownership by legal persons who have operating or
long-term relationship with the listed company; the latter represents ownership
resulting from public fund raising activities.
Shares are classified into state-owned shares, state-owned legal person shares,
and shares of members of the Chinese public according to this corporate ownership
structure in China. lo5 While members of the public can trade their shares among
themselves on the securities market, state-owned share is prohibited, and state-owned
legal person shares can only be traded among state-owned legal persons.106 With such
ownership structure, the securities market can not operate well in state-owned and
105 Apart from these categories, shares can be further classified into A shares, B shares, C shares, and
N shares. For detailed discussion about the share structure in China, see C.X. Yao, Stock Market and
Futures Market in the People sRepublic ofChina (Oxford University Press, New York, 1998), p. 3-37.
106 See (1994) 12 Gazette of the People s Republic of China (Oxford University Press, New York,
1998), p. 18.
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state-controlled companies. Some studies have already showed that shares held by
state played a negative role in corporate governance, domestic institutional and
managerial shareholdings improved the firms' performance. I07
b). Concentrated Share Ownership
In China, since a large portion of listed companies are restructured state-owned
enterprises, there is a great degree of ownership concentration of state-owned shares.
After more than twenty years of economic reforms, the proportion of the public sector
in China has reduced significantly. However, this decrease of public sector does not
mean that the private sector plays an important role in the national economy. The
state-owned or the state-controlled companies are also the main part in the Chinese
economy. In the two stock exchanges in China,108 In terms of corporate governance,
the most striking feature of China is that on average the state directly holds a 38%
share in listed firms. In addition the state indirectly holds controlling positions
through state controlled institutions termed "legal persons" which are referred to as
domestic and placement institutions and total a further 21 % of issued share capital.
Legal persons, typically investment trusts and other asset management companies
have been allocated shares in the listed companies to act as a form of
quasi-institutional investor. They are expected to use their positions not as
representatives of the state, but as professional investors. It is unclear who represent
the state as a shareholder in the listed companies during the transaction. I09 The
largest shareholder in listed companies has 44.9 percent of the total share averagely.
In contrast, the second-largest shareholder typically owns a mere 8.2 percent. 11D
107 Chen, Jian. Ownership Structure as Corporate Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Chinese
Listed Companies, Economics of Planning. Dordrecht: 200 I. Vol. 34, Iss. 1-2; p. 53.
108 Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Both of them were established in 1990.
109 The law authorizes a department or institution to supervise the operation of state assets in a
state-owned or state-controlled company. However, the department or institution does not directly take
part in corporate operations and can only influence the management by exercising shareholders' rights.
However, on practice, these state agents do not exercise shareholders' rights and duties diligently and
make the managers of these companies act in the interests of the shareholder (the State).
110 See the issue of China Securities on July 200 I.
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Under such a scenario, majority shareholders can easily ignore minority investors and
use information asymmetries.
The largest shareholder, which is different from that of Canadian corporations, is
usually the state, holds almost 45% of the total shares in average in a listed company.
The related party transactions between controlling shareholders or a group company
and the listed company are often detrimental to minority shareholders in practice.
The 1994 Company Law also requires the state to subscribe at least 35 percent of
the total shares issued. I I I The state shares in these corporations are not tradable on
the market. In the state-owned or state-controlled companies, the control right belong
to the bureaucrats. These bureaucrats can be thought of as having extremely
concentrated rights, but no significant cash flow rights because the cash flow
ownership of state firms is effectively dispersed amongst the taxpayers of the
country.112 From this perspective, the state ownership of Chinese system of corporate
governance is an example of concentrated control with no cash flow rights and
socially harmful objectives. 113 This structure of state ownership and control of firms
accounts for their poor performance. I 14 Furtherm ore increasing state ownership is
negatively related to good corporate performance. I IS
c). Cross-Ownership of Chinese Companies
As noted above, there are diverse types of participants In Chinese corporate
III Ma, Shu Y., "The Chinese Route to Privatization: The Evolution of the Shareholding Option,"
Asian Survey 38:4 (April 1998), pp. 379-397, at 381-382.
112 Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. "A Survey of Corporate Governance." Journal ofFinance, 52 (1997),
737-783. p. 768.
113 Ibid.
114 See Tenev, S. and Zhang, c., Corporate Governance and Enterprises Reform in China: Building
the Institutions ofModern Markets, World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, Washington,
D.C.,2002
liS Tian, G.L.H. (2001), State Shareholding and the Value of Chinese Firms, Working Paper, London
Business School, at:
http://forum.london.edullbsfacpubs.nsf/(httppublications2/085217AF53BA5AA 180256A24003DF5FC
(Access date: May 21, 2004).
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ownership: state-owned, domestic institutional investors, employees, large
blockholders, and foreign institutional investors.
This cross-ownership has a deep influence on the Chinese corporate governance.
In China, state-assets stripping has taken place when new institutional property
owners were created through complicated patterns of cross-ownership. 116 Th is
cross-ownership pattern has a positive relation with the state-owned enterprises' (SOE)
reform, however, this has a negative effect on the economy. State-assets stripping
accrues when non-state but state-affiliated enterprises involve in selling their products
and services. With the downward transfer of property rights, SOEs were either spun
off into semi-public companies, leased, subcontracted, or even taken over by
individuals or other SOEs, creating new categories of institutional property owners.117
II Institutions in Canadian and Chinese Corporate Governance
1. The Canadian and Chinese Board of Directors
The board of directors is the legal and accountable group responsible for all the
corporation's actions and the results of those actions. From legal point of view, the
patterns of corporate structure under the two legal systems are generally known as
"two-tier boards (Board of Directors and Board of Supervisors) system" or
"internal-regulation mode" and "one-tier board (Board of Directors) system" or
"external-regulation mode".118 Whether a corporation adopts "two-tier boards" or
116 Xu, Yochong, State-assets depletion and economic reform in China Studies in Comparative
International Development. New Brunswick: Spring 2000. Vol. 35, Iss. 1; pg. 73, 28 pgs.
117 Ibid
118 The one-tier board model is academically considered as a shareholder and market-oriented model
with a purpose to maximize shareholders' wealth and relies on external regulatory mechanisms. In
contrast, the two-tier board model originated in a society with relatively less developed external
regulatory mechanisms and there was thus a strong need for an internal control device such as the
supervisory board to supervise corporate performance. For details, see Moerland, P. W. (1995).
Alternative Disciplinary Mechanisms in Different Corporate Systems, Journal of Economic Behaviour
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"one-tier board" corporate structure is subject to the applicable company law of its
registration nation.
Boards of directors of companies in Anglo-Saxon countries including the United
States, Canada, and United Kingdom are based on one-board system. In some
European countries including Germany, Austria, the boards of directors of listed
companies are based on two-tier system. Some other countries, such as France, are
allowed to adopt either the one-tier model or the two-tier model by the national
legislation. The two board models are designed to support the independence of board
of directors. China, its corporate governance developed in the middle of last decade of
20th century which is greatly influenced by both the Anglo-Saxon system of corporate
governance and the Continental-European system of corporate governance, adopts
two-tier system as its board structure.
Evidences show that there is a strong relationship between board composition and
corporate performance. Regardless of which board structure is adopted, the board that
has a majority of independent directors behaves differently than the boards without a
majority of independent directors and should operate within a corporate governance
framework. 119 Also there may be different ways of organizing things, but the bottom
line is that whatever board model is being followed, all corporations need an
executive and supervisory function and to allocate responsibility. 120 Board
and Organization, 26(1), pp. 17-34. and Shleifer, A. and R. Vishny (1997). A Survey of Corporate
Governance, Journal of Finance, 52(2), pp. 737-782.
119 The most widely debated question in the first line of research is whether having more outside
directors is associated with better firm performance. For example, Baysinger and Butler (1985), who
find weak evidence that firms with a higher percentage of outsiders on the board in 1970 had a higher
industry-adjusted return on equity in 1980. Schellenger, Wood and Tashakori (1989) also show that
outside director representation is positively related to return on assets and on risk-adjusted stock returns.
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) argue that board composition is one of anum ber of endogenously
determined corporate governance mechanisms, including the use of debt, the labor market for managers,
the market for corporate control, insider shareholdings, institutional shareholdings, block holdings and
the use of independent board members. Also, other studies fail to find a significant relation, such as
Hermalin and Weisbach ( 1991)
120 See, THE REVIEW OF THE OECD PRINCIPLES OF CORPORA TE GOVERNANCE, Report on a
meeting of trade union experts held under the OEeD Labour/Management Programme, (Paris, 19 June
2003), at 2 I.
45
independence is supported by a board structure that separates decision-management
from decision-controI. 12I
a). The One-tier Board System of Canada
i. Attributes ofOne-tier Board System ofCanada
The one-tier board system is found in the United Kingdom and other
Anglo-Saxon influenced countries including United States, Canada etc. In this system,
executive and non-executive (independent) directors are brought together in a single
structure, which assumes all directors are equal and share collective responsibility for
decision.
The attributes of the one-tier model can be summarized that CEO-duality (role of
CEO and chairperson held simultaneously) is allowed under this model and that a
board composition (inside directors and outside directors) can be dominated by
executive directors. Both CEO-duality and board composition are at least potential
threads to the independence of board of directors practically and theoretically. In
Canada, the functions of CEO and Chairman are still often combined. The CEO is
often the member of nominating committee.
During these years, the international call for corporate governance reform is
strongly reflected by a fierce and ongoing discussion on the attributes of one-tier
boards. The one-tier board system is considered by some authors that these boards are
no more than ceremonial rubber-stamping devices to support the objectives of
management. 122 However, with a strong presence of independent directors, the
one-tier board system can ensure the board accountability.
In Canada's perspective, the role of the board of directors has two basic functions:
121 Jensen, M.e. and Meckling W.H. (1976). Theory ofFirm ~Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305-360.
122 See, Rechner, P. L. and Dalton, D. R. (1991), CEO Duality and Organizational Performance: A
Longitudinal Analysis, Strategic management Journal, 12: 155-160.
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decision-making and supervision. The decision-making function is exercised with
respect to the formulation with management of fundamental policies and strategic
goals and through the approval of certain significant actions; the supervision function
concerns the review of management decisions, the adequacy of systems and controls
and the implementation of policies. 123
The Dey committee goes beyond the traditional dichotomy of the one-tier system
between inside and outside directors, and argues that every board of directors should
have a majority of unrelated directors who are non-management directors and are free
from any business or other relationship. 124 T he Canada Business Corporations Act
currently requires at least two unrelated directors on the board of a public firm.
Toronto Stock Exchange Committee on Corporate Governance in Canada (the Dey
Committee) recommended that a majority of all directors of listed companies be
unrelated.
The main difference between unrelated and outside directors lies with the fact that
a director who is an employee or representative of a company that provides a service
to the company, such as a banker, lawyer or accountant, is an outside director but may
not be considered unrelated, according to the Dey Report. With regard to the
differences between unrelated and independent directors, the term of "independent
123 The Dey Report, in its first set of guidelines, describes the roles of boards as following: (i) adoption
of a strategic planning process; (ii) the identification of the principal risks of the corporation's business
and ensuring the implementation of appropriate systems to manage these risks; (iii) succession
planning, including appointing, training and monitoring senior management; (iv) a communications
policy fro the corporation; (v) the integrity of the corporation's internal control and management
information systems.
124 Dey Report, the Guideline 4 says that "a director who is free from any interest and any business or
other relationship which could, or could reasonably be perceived to, materially interfere with the
director's ability to act with a view to the best interests of the corporation, other than interests and
relationships arising from shareholding. An amendment of definition of unrelated director proposed
recently by TSX as follows: "unrelated director" means a director who is: (a) not a member of
management and is free from any interest and any business, family or other relationship which could
reasonably be perceived to materially interfere with the director's ability to act wth a view to the best
interests of the issuer, other than interests and relationships arising solely from holdings in the issuer (b)
not currently, or has not been within the last three years, an officer, employee of or material service
provider to the issuer or an of its subsidiaries or affiliates and (c) not a director (or similarly situated
individual) officer, employee or significant shareholder of an entity that has a material business
relationship with the issuer. TSX dos not consider a chair or vice chair of the board of director who is
not a member of management to be a related diector.
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directors" only occurs in a statutory or regulatory context in Canada in the OSC's
Rule 61-50 I and its Quebec counterpart QSC 27125 as well as MI 52-II 0 audit
committee126. In the regulation 58-101, a director is independent ifhe or she would be
independent within the meaning of section 1.4 of Multilateral Instrument 52-110
Audit Committees. 127 T he purpose of the Audit Committee Rule is to encourage
reporting issuers to establish and maintain strong, effective and independent audit
committees. In this point, The Dey Report is different from the Chinese Guidance. 128
It fails to fully introduce the concept of independent director.
The past twenty years in Canada have seen a dramatic change in the way boards
of directors are organized and operated. It is now accepted that boards must be active,
must add value to the corporation, and be effective contributors to corporate
competitiveness, and must be more responsible to its shareholders and stakeholders. 129
ii. Board Structure
The number of directors on a board is a factor in the board's effectiveness.
Studies show that the size of board has an inverse relationship with the corporate
performance130 or no significant relationship131.132 In the late 1960's, the report by
125 Carol Hansell, What Directors Need to Know: Corporate Governance, (Toronto: Carswell, 2003),
p.76.
126 In Canada, there is an exemption for controlled companies from the audit committee independence
rules. This reflects an accommodation for the higher proportion of family-owned and other controlled
public companies in the Canadian market. Also, audit committees are not required to hire and fire the
independent auditors, because Canadian corporate law vests this power to the shareholders. Instead, the
audit committee must make a recommendation to the board about the candidate who will be proposed
to the shareholders for election as auditor. If the board does not follow the audit committee's
recommendation, it must disclose this fact. In addition, independent auditors are prohibited from
performing various non-audit services for their audit clients.
127 See national instrument 58-101, Disclosure ofCorporate Governance Practices
128 Guidance to Establishment of Independent Board Director's System in Listed Company, see the
following of this thesis.
129 See 1. Longair, Choosing the board of Directors for the 90's (Ottawa: The Conference Board of
Canad, 1992) at 3.
130 See Bohren, 0., and Bernt Arne Odegaard. 2001. Corporate Governance and Economic
Performance: A Closer Look. In Working Paper.
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Laurence Committee in Canada stressed the important effect of the non-executive
board directors on the improvement of corporate profits, which predicted a trend that
people started to regard the independent board directors as the major protectors of the
shareholder's equity and public interests. 133 The Dey committee goes beyond the
traditional dichotomy between inside and outside directors, and argues that every
board of directors should have a majority of unrelated directors. The TSE adopted the
Dey Committee recommendations as a listing requirement in 1995. Companies had to
specifY their specific corporate governance practices with reference to each of the
guidelines either in the annual report or in the proxy statement. The board
independence is the primary focus of the Dey Report; it includes recommendations
that boards have a majority of unrelated directors and that the positions of board chair
and CEO are held by different persons. The report of the Joint Committee on
Corporate Governance set up by the TSX, CDNX and CICA in order to examine the
effectiveness of the Dey recommendations. 134 Sauc ier's strategy was to focus more
on behavior and less on its structure. However, the report has recommended that it be
a condition of listing on the TSE that an issuer's board of directors have a designated
"Independent Board Leader." The report also clearly expresses its preference for a
non-executive chairman of the board. 135
With regard to the number of directors, the number of directors on a board is a
factor in the board's effectiveness. Canadian Business Corporation Act ("CBCA")
does not impose a limit on the maximum number of directors, so that in theory, very
131 See Fuerst, 0., and S.H. Kang. 2000. Corporate Governance, Expected Operating Performance and
Pricing. Draft.
132 See Foerster, Stephen R., Gross, Rob, Shapiro, Daniel and Toner, Martin, 2004, General Trends
on Corporate Governance Practices Amongst Canadian Firms: 1999 - 2001 A preliminary analysis of
select governance data for Canadian firms, For Industry Canada
133 Zhuo, Chenggang Independence: Foundation for Functions of Independent Board Directors,
USA-China Business Review, Volume 3,No. I (Serial No. 14), Jan.2003, at 68.
134 Jo int Committee on Corporate Governance, "Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance
Culture," (The Saucier Report) Toronto: Chartered Accountants of Canada, Toronto Stock Exchange,
and Canadian Venture Exchange, November 2001.
135 Kenn eth Wiener, William Gorman and Goodmans LLP, The Saucier Report on Corporate
Governance, at wwwcba.org.
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large boards of directors are possible.1 36137 A variable number of directors permit the
governance structure of a corporation to be adjusted to reflect changes in the make-up
of the corporation. 138 The general view is that an appropriate board size is between
five and sixteen directors. Empirical studyl39 shows that the appropriate number of
directors will vary with the size and nature of the corporation. However, the minimum
number of directors with at least three directors for public companies is often imposed
by the corporation acts. 140
b). Two-tier Board System of China
The two-tier system prevails in Germany, Austria, Sweden, Finland, and
Denmark as well as in major stock corporations in Netherlands. In this system, the
supervisory and management functions are separated. The supervisory or upper-tier
board is typically concerned with overseeing management of company and consists
wholly of non-executive members. The lower-tier board (management board) is made
up of executive directors.
Chinese system of corporate governance is a corporate governance system for
socialist state which is influenced by the Anglo-Saxon system and the German,
Japanese systems. However there is a gap between the model and the reality. In
contrast to the Anglo-Saxon one-tier board, the Chinese board is similar to the
German dual board system l41 which is divided between the management board and
136 For some provincial acts, such as Ontario Business Corporation Act, they also do not impose the
limit on the maximum number of directors. For details, see Kevin Patrick McGuinness, The Law and
Practice ofCanadian Business Corporations, (Toronto and Vancouver: Butterworths, 1999), p.655.
137 La Loi sur les compagnie du Quebec indicate the number of board of directors is no less than three
members. See art. 83 of the Loi sur les compagnie du Quebec.
138 Ibid. p.656.
139 Foerster, Stephen R., Gross, Rob, Shapiro, Daniel and Toner, Martin, 2004, General Trends on
Corporate Governance Practices Amongst Canadian Firms: 1999 - 2001 A preliminary analysis of
select governance data for Canadian firms, For Industry Canada
140 The board of directors of a corporation must consist of at least on director in the case of a
corporation that is not an offering corporation, and at least three directors where the corporation is an
offering corporation. See Subsection 115 (2) of the OBCA and CBCA, s. 6(1 )(e).
141 For a more detailed description of German and Anglo-American Board systems, see Jeremy Bacon
& James K. Brown, The Board ofDirectors: Perspectives and Practices in Nine Countries, Research
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the supervisory board. According to the Chinese legislation, Chinese listed companies
adopt a two-tier board structure,142 a Board of Directors (BOD) and a Board of
Supervisors. They are also required to provide in their annual reports a supervisory
board report (SBR).
The board of directors consists of insider directors (executive directors) and
outsider directors (non-executive directors), the independence of director is a major
topic with regard to the board of directors in the context of Chinese companies. The
supervisory board has the primary duty to monitor the directors and managers'
compliance with legal procedures. Due to this duty of supervisory board, the conflicts
between the board of directors and the supervisory board is not avoidable.
i. Attributes ofTwo-tier Board System ofChina
Compared with the no limit on the maximum number of director in Canada, the
Company Law ofChina imposes a strict limit on the minimum and maximum number
of board of directors. 143 With respect to the state-owned and state-controlled
companies, directors of state-owned companies, the board members in the
state-controlled companies as well as the state shareholder representatives in the
state-controlled companies are all appointed by the state asset management
institutions at present. The board in these companies consists of mainly executive
directors, few independent directors. All these professional ethics can lead to "insider
control" as another attribute of the two-tier board system ofChinese companies. As in
Canada, there are no provisions in the Chinese Company Law relating to the
Reportjrom the Conference Board's Division ofManagement Research. (1977) at 81.
142 See the Company Law of the People's Republic of China. Article II 2: A joint stock limited
company shall have a board of directors, which shall be composed of not fewer than 5 but not more
than 19 members. Article 124: Ajoint stock limited company shall have a board of supervisors, which
shall be composed of not fewer than 3 members. The board of supervisors shall elect one member to
serve as the person responsible for calling meetings
143 A limited liability company shall have a board of directors, which shall be composed of not fewer
than 3 but not more than 13 directors. A joint stock limited company shall have a board of directors.
which shall be composed of not fewer than 5 but not more than 19 mem bers. See article 45 and 112 of
company law for details.
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composition of the Board of Directors. Research shows that boards of directors in
Chinese listed companies have been dominated by representatives of state and legal
person shareholders, to the effective exclusion of representatives of individual
shareholders. 144
ii. The Independence ofBoard ofDirectors
The independence of a board of directors from management is one of the
important issues in the context of corporate governance. A board is ineffective when it
is dominated by executive directors (managers or insiders) because the managers are
monitoring themselves. The presence of non-executive directors (outsiders) can
enhance the independence of a board. 145 Th e independent board director's system is
brand new in China. Independence is the key to the functioning of the independent
board directors.
Chinese Company Law does not stress this issue of independent directors, the
Guidelines for Publicly-Listed Companies' Articles of Association (promulgated by
the China Securities Regulatory Commission "CSRC" in December, 1997) suggests
that publicly-listed companies may retain independent directors at their option, and
makes further clarification for disqualification of independent directors as welI. I46
Two other opinions promulgated by CSRC in the following two years with regard to
overseas publicly-listed companies, which also allow for the retention,
144 See Xu, X. and Wang. Y., "Ownership Structure, Corporate Governance, and Firms' Performance:
The Case of Chinese Stock Companies." Working Paper, World Bank (1997). In this paper authors
presented data based on the annual reports and sample surveys of more than 300 of these companies
listed on the two exchanges and concluded that state or legal persons held respectively over 70% of the
board seats on average. Government officials filled half of all board positions, a proportion
significantly higher than the state's shareholding (held in the form of state-owned shares). As noted by
On Kit Tam (The Development of Corporate Governance in China, Edward Elgar Publishing, 1999)
p74, one of the obstacles facing active participation by individual shareholders in electing directors is
that many companies restrict participation in the shareholders' meeting by reference to a minimum
level of shareholding.
145 Dalton, D R, Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. 1998. Meta-analytic Reviews ofBoard
Composition, Leadership Structure, and Financial Performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3):
269-290.
146 See Guidelinesfor Publicly-Listed Companies' Articles ofAssociation.
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disqualification, number and powers of independent directors by overseas
publicly-listed companies. In 2000, the Shanghai Securities Exchange (SSE) also
provides details for the retention and disqualification of independent directors in its
Guidelines for Publicly-Listed Companies' Governing System. The newest
development in this area is that On August 16, 2001, the Chinese Securities
Supervision Commission issued the "Guidance to Establishment of Independent
Board Director s System in Listed Company" (hereafter abbreviated as "Guidance"),
which stipulates detailed provisions with regard to independent directors. Thus, even
though the Chinese Company Law does not address their use, on the basis of the
above descriptions elsewhere in Chinese regulation, it can be reasonably expected that
independent directors may appear in more and more publicly-listed companies in the
foreseeable future. Overhaul the insider-controlled board structure by promulgation a
regulation requiring each listed company to have at least one-third of the board to be
independent directors by June 2003.
However, in the perspective of Chinese state-owned or state-controlled
companies, we argued that most independent directors can hardly be considered truly
independent. These directors are not appointed through market decision but decided
by the governmental administration. The outside directors normally have close ties
with the big shareholder (the state) or the managers of the same company.
There are several reasons that the use of independent board directors can not play
their full roles as might be expected in their true sense. First, there is the issue of
independence. Since state-owned or state-owned companies hold significant
percentages of most Chinese publicly-listed companies, the election, removal and
remuneration of independent directors rely primarily on the consent of the controlling
shareholder. This can cast a shadow on the true independence of those elected as
independent directors. Secondly, there is still an absence of consistency in regulatory
appl ication. The "Guidance" is also hard to ensure the independence of the
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independent board directors. 147 Thirdly, internal conflicts of interest have not all been
eliminated. Some powers of independent directors currently overlap with other
organizations within their companies. There still needs to be some careful design to
avoid causing internal conflicts with supervisory boards and the chairman. Finally,
there are still liability questions. Due to the lack of detailed provision on the duty of
care, duty of faith and business judgment rules under the Chinese Company Law, the
liability of independent directors is still somewhat unclear under China's legal system.
Thus, although the use of independent directors can bring positive influences to
Chinese companies, the practice is still young, leaving some areas that need to be
worked out before the process is clear.
iii. The Supervisory Board
The supervisory board in China is a combination of the German-style supervisory
committee and China's traditional concept of employees as masters of enterprises.
According to Chinese company law, the Supervisory Board mainly supervises the
board members and management staffs. 148 As part of its functions, the Supervisory
Board must monitor the financial affaires, supervise the performances of directors and
managers, propose the convening of an interim shareholders' meeting, and exercise
other power stipulated by the law.
The supervisory board comprises representatives of the shareholders and
147 The "Guidance" stipulates that only the board of directors, supervision commission of a listed
company and the shareholders who hold separately or jointly 1% of the issued shares may propose their
candidates of the independent board directors. This stipulation is to present the right to nominate
independent board directors to the large shareholders (since at present, the state is the largest
shareholder in most Chinese listed companies, it control both the board of directors and supervision
commission in a listed company). Also with regard to the nomination mechanism of independent board,
the independent board directors are hard to be independent. As stipulated in the "Guidance", a listed
company should offer an independent board director an appropriate amount of allowance. The
allowance standard should be drafted first by the board of directors, and then discussed and passed by
the stockholders' meeting. That is to say the nomination of independent directors is not decided through
the market decision by appointed by local or central government administration. For more details, see,
Chenggang Zhuo, Independence: Foundation for Functions of Independent Board Directors,
USA-China Business Review. New York, Jan. 2003, Volume 3, No. I (Serial No. 14).
148 See Art. 54 of Company Law ofPRo China.
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employees and at least formally, has extensive powers to supervise the board of
directors. 149 T he Company Law does not specifY the proportion of shareholders'
representatives and employees' representatives on supervisory committees but just
requires that corporate charters properly stipulate the proportion. The chairman of the
board of directors is designed as the legal representative of the company. The legal
representative is in principle the person who must sign documents binding the
company. ISO
Company Law and Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies
provides the key role of supervisory board is to supervise the corporate finance as
well as to supervise the due diligence of directors, management staff, to safeguard the
corporate assets, to reduce the corporate operational and financial risks, and to protect
the corporate and the shareholders' interests.
In China's corporate practice, however, there remains a strong need to improve
the usefulness of the supervisory board and strengthen its function. The supervision of
supervisory boards is more theoretical than practical. The published announcements
of Supervisory boards of listed companies in China show that they rarely contest
decisions made by boards of directors and company executives. Supervisors generally
meet less often than boards of directors and their meetings are less well attended.
Besides, the lower-quality and less professional experience of supervisors have led to
supervisors' inability of supervision
2. The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance
Institutional investors have been holders of debt capital for over century. The
institutional investors need this kind of investment for their own purposes.
Proportions of equity held by institutional investors are rising significantly across the
149 See Art. 126 of Company Law ofPR. China
150 See Art. 113 and 22 (9) of Company Law ofPRo China
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world. Four paradigms of corporate governance are outlined, of which three involve a
key role for institutions. These are characterized as market control via equity (the
takeover sanction), market control via debt and direct control via equity (corporate
governance activism). Empirical evidence shows that the rise in institutional
shareholdings in recent decades has been associated with better corporate
performance. 151
However, some restrictions on the equity investment can be seen in some
countries. There is also empirical evidence concerning the role of institutional
investors as equity holders in countries that do not have restrictions on equity
investments by financial institutions. The evidence is that if institutional investors
who are equity holders are more effective monitors,152 then agency problems in the
countries, which permit to take large equity positions in firms, including firms to
which they made loans, should be less than those in the other countries. These facts
all have very significant influences on corporate governance. Evidence at a micro
level for favorable influences of these mechanisms on corporate performance is mixed,
but on balance positive. In the Canadian and Chinese perspectives, the former is
showing an increase in direct influence of institutions in place of the previous reliance
on the takeover mechanism to discipline managers. This has arguably led to improved
corporate performance. 153 The latter remain more firmly in the bank-relationship
based governance paradigm. The purpose of this part is to explain the role played by
institutional investors in influencing corporate governance both in Canada and in
China. At the same time, we also point out that such differences of institutional roles
between the two systems should not be exaggerated, and the convergence is
151 See Parkinson, l, Gamble, A., and Kelly, 0., The Political Economy ofthe Company, (Oxford and
Portland: Hart Publishing, 2000), p.199.
152 Hartzell, 1 C. and L.T. Starks, 2000, "Institutional Investors and Executive Compensation,"
working paper New York University and University of Texas at Austin. They find evidence in this
paper suggesting that institutional investors provide a monitoring role with regard to executive
compensation contracts.
153 See E Philip Davis, Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance at:
http://www.brunel.ac.uk/depts/ecf/research/papers/00-19.pdf (access date: Aug. 12,2004). p. 15.
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discernible on a modified form of the Anglo-Saxon model where institutions are the
primary actors in corporate governance generally.154
a). Canada
The development of institutional investors l55 and their growing dominance as
owners of corporations has had a pervasive and increasing influence on Canadian
corporate governance. 156 This influence is not surprising that they have become more
active in the role as shareholders of a firm. The activism by these investors has been
both private and public, with the public activism perhaps most visible and is
progressively replacing the private activism in Canada. The institutions exercise a
significant influence on corporate performance through their economic power due to
their debt and equity holding.
MacIntosh and Schwartz l57 examine the performance measures for TSE 300
firms and find that the return on assets and return on equity of these firms is positively
related to the size of institutional holdings. This study shows that there is a positive
relationship between the institutional investors and firm performance in Canada.
Moreover, this study also indicates that institutional investors have the function to
both monitor and discipline controlling shareholders.
There are a number of different categories of institutional investors including
public pension funds, corporate pension funds, union pension funds, retail mutual
funds, banks and thrifts, insurance and annuity companies and private foundations. 158
154 Ibid.
155 Institutional investors in Canada include banks, insurance companies, pension funds, investment
funds, etc.
156 Financial institutions hold an important and ever growing volume of shares especially in Canadian
public corporations. See S. Rousseau, L'influence des Investisseurs Institutionnels sur la Regie
d'Entreprise au Canada, (1996) 37, Les Cahiers de Droit Universite Laval 305-376.
157 MacIntosh, 1. G. and Schwartz, L. P., Do Institutional and Controlling Shareholders Increase
Corporate Value? in Corporate Decision-Making in Canada, RJ. Daniels and R. Morck (eds.), Industry
Canada Research Series, University of Calgary Press, 1995.
158 See 1. Barnard, Institutional Investors and the New Corporate Governance, (1991) 69 North
Carolina Law Review p.1140-41.
57
Distinctions must be made between different types of institutional investors.
In Canada, banks are large and actively involved in corporate lending and
recently in underwriting and brokerage activities. The big six Canadian banks,159
which operate under the Bank Act, now occupy a dominant position in Canada's
economic and monetary system. In the increasingly competitive global economy,
dynamic suppliers of funds are a strategic asset that companies must have if they are
to expand at home and abroad. However, in Canada, traditionally, banks were
prohibited by law from holding equity in a firm. The ability of banks to control stakes
in industrial firms and to invest over 60 percent of their capital portfolio has been
limited: they have been prohibited from owning more than 25 percent of the equity or
controlling more than 10 percent ofthe voting rights ofa single issuer. 160
Following the financial reforms of 1987 (which allowed banks to purchase or
develop securities dealer subsidiaries) and the 1992 Bank Act (which granted them
additional powers), banks have entered a range of new businesses. 161 For example,
Since 30 June 1987, Ontario has allowed Canadian financial institutions to own up to
100 per cent ofa securities dealer in that province. 162
Although banks play a major role in Canadian corporate governance, other
institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds, have historically
played no more than a minimal role on corporate governance.
With regard to the pension funds, over the past 10 years there has been
widespread debate about the role and status of pension funds in relation to corporate
159 The big six Canadian banks are: Bank of Montreal, the Bank of Nova Scotia, Canadian Imperial
Bank of Commerce, National Bank of Canada, Royal Bank of Canada, and the Toronto-Dominion
Bank.
160 Bank Act., c. B-1, art 466(1); Saving and Credit Funds Act. c. C-4.1, art. 257, 403, Trust Companies
and Saving Companies Act, c. S-29.01, art. 208.
161 Jim Armstrong The changing business activities of banks in Canada, p.12. at
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/publications/review/r972a.pdf (access date: 9 Aug. 2004).
162 Ibid. p.15.
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governance. 163 Canadian pension fund assets have grown to make up a huge part of
the TSX. In this regard, Canadian Coalition for Good Governance 164 is an
organization set up by 33 Canadian pension funds and institutional investors with an
aggregate of over $500 billion under management. The Coalition has published
corporate governance standards and lobbies companies to adopt these standards.
These standards closely reflect the existing TSX guidelines and the best practices
proposed by the securities regulators.
In Canadian practice, unfortunately, many of the largest firms in Canada are all
but impervious to pressure from pension funds to improve corporate governance and
corporate productivity. Only a small minority ofCanadian firms are widely held. 165
Generally say, the institutional investors influence corporate governance in
Canada by the following two ways: institutional investors' involvement in corporate
governance and institutional investors' disengagement in corporate governance.
b). China
A healthy banking system is an absolute prerequisite for good corporate
governance because banks provide the necessary capital and liquidity for corporate
transactions and growth. 166 Furtherm ore, the participation of banks in corporate
ownership and management structures can allow a firm to take a longer-term view in
their decision-making and focus on the long-term profitability of the firm. In China, it
is even more important that there is a good banking system as this will establish good
governance since banks provide most of the finance. Chinese system of corporate
163 See Clark, G. L., Pensionfimds and corporate governance: An Anglo-American perspective, paper
presented at the European Pensions 2000 conference sponsored by Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 5th &
6th October 2000, Trianon Palace, Versailles, France.
164 The mission of the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance is to represent Canadian institutional
shareholders through the promotion of best corporate governance practices and to align the interests of
boards and management with those of the shareholder.
165 Morek, R., Pensions: Whose stock market is it, anyway? Monday, June 24, 2002, National Post.
166 Cheung, Stephen YL. and Zhou, Lynda, Instituting Corporate Governance in China, Department
ofEconomic and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, at: www.iwep.org.cn.
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governance should be a kind of system in which banks consciously play a dynamic
role in corporate governance. Banks' ability to financial and supervise corporations
should be widely utilized in China. 167 From the German and Japanese experience, in
certain circumstances, banks have significant influence on corporate governance, and
can be a more efficient and less expensive mechanism of monitoring corporate
performance and rescuing distressed companies than the securities market.
As discussed above, the characteristics of corporate ownership structure in China
make the banks become even more important in Chinese system of corporate
governance. The four State-owned commercial banks (SOCBs) that dominate the
market--Agricultural Bank of China (ABC), Bank of China (BOC), China
Construction Bank (CCB), and Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC).
However, the primary source of financing for SOEs has been through the above
state-owned banking system accustomed to poor lending practices and making
political commitments to support failing companies, resulting in numerous
non-performing loans l68 which impede the banks performance in recent years.
The heavy debt burden of state-owned enterprises is one of the important
problems during the economic reform in China. The Chinese government has taken
many policies and measures to reduce this burden. To write off the bad debts,
especially the bad debts from banks, is one important measure. However, the
asset-liability ratio remains high. The government launches a full attack on the
problem by using the method of debt-equity swap. By converting debts into stocks,
the state-banks can become the stock ownership of companies by writing off
unrecoverable loans using the state's equity as well as their own profits and
reserves.
169 The conversion of debt into stock is an important move for improving the
167 Wei, Yuwa, Comparative Corporate Governance. A Chinese Perspective, (Kluwer Law
International, 2003), p. 25.
168 Cheung, Stephen YL. and Zhou, Lynda, Instituting Corporate Governance in China, Department
of Economic and Finance, City University of Hong Kong, at: www.iwep.org.cn.
169 Under a reform plan of the year 2004 that includes a US$45billion capital injection, Bank of China
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SOEs' asset-liability structure. It can reduce the financing costs of the companies and
enable them to develop further. Moreover, it also helps banks participate in corporate
governance. It is a step toward accelerating the establishment of a new-type
bank-enterprise relationship. 170 A well-regulated banking system is crucial in
formulating Chinese system of corporate governance. A bank-based system is less
dependent on well defined property rights and a high quality of legal enforcement
(take-over code, insider trade restrictions, and strict disclosure rules). This explains
why many developing countries or transition economies have no other choice than to
adopt a bank-based system.171
Besides the influence of strong banking system on corporate governance, there
are few domestic pension funds and mutual funds which have deep influences on
corporate governance. However, one of the most important tendencies which can be
identified is the emergence of the institutions of mutual and pension funds which hold
now a broad fraction of equity in China today.172 Pension reform will increasingly
bring a rise in popularity of mutual funds and thus additional pressure for good
corporate governance. Good corporate governance will also help Chinese firms
compete in the globalizing economy, and greatly attract foreign investment. The
influence of foreign investors on Chinese corporate governance is significant because
they have become such a large component of this emerging market.
and China Construction Bank have been allowed to write off unrecoverable loans using the ministry's
equity as well as their own profits and reserves, according to banking officials and analysts.
170 Zeng, Peiyan, State-owned Entrprises Reforms, People's Daily, Tuesday, November 09, 1999, also
at: http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/speciallsoe!l9991109000 IOl.html (access date: 18, Aug. 2004)
171 Rajan R.G. and Zingales L. (1998) Which Capitalism? Lessons from the East Asian crisis, Journal
ofApplied Corporate Governance, II: 40-48.
172 However the institutional investors are still a weak group in China compared with other developed
countries. By the end of 2003, proprietary trading and investment in the funds by securities companies
accounted for less than 10 percent of the capitalization of the negotiable shares in China's stock market.
PART THREE: COMPARATIVE STUDY BETWEEN THE
CANADIAN AND THE CHINESE SYSTEMS
Comparative study between different systems of corporate governance has been a
major field since the last decade of 20th century. Corporate governance issues and
impact on national competitiveness are a central subject matter both in the advanced
economies, such as Canada and emerging, transitional economies, such as China.
I Is One Corporate Governance System Better than the Other
Corporate Governance mechanisms vary a great deal around the world. As we
discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, the Canadian and the Chinese
systems of corporate governance differ significantly from each other in the different
goals and consequent structures of the corporations. With regard to the legal
protection of investors, firms in the Canada, like firms in other Anglo-Saxon countries,
substantially rely on legal protection of investors. Studies have shown that countries
with poorer investor protections, measured by both the character of legal rules and the
quality of law enforcement, have smaller and narrower capital markets. 173
When analyzing these two quite different systems, the question naturally arises as
to whether one of them is better than the other. Generally stated, poor corporate
governance is seen as risky, while good corporate governance is seen as a sign of
strength. 174
Good corporate governance systems are rooted in an appropriate combination of
173 See La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert W. Vishny (1997),
"Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal ofFinance. 52, 1131-1150
174 Lee, 1. 2001. Corporate governance - and why you need it. Asiamoney 12 (9): 24-6.
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legal protection of investors and some form of concentrated ownership.175 Corporate
governance scandals both in emerging and in developed markets indicate that there is
no best corporate governance model in the world. A good corporate governance
system is about good practice and not merely about good structure. That is to say, it
should be capable of identifying corporate weaknesses before they develop into
systemic problems, of learning from failures, and of taking prompt corrective actions.
Critical ingredients of such a system are a credible threat of market failure. So we
must be diligent in evaluating the performance of the boards of the companies whose
shares we own to ensure that the governance system is working.
IL Characteristics ofCorporate Governance Mechanisms
The corporate governance mechanisms are of interest to investors, corporate
practitioners, regulators, and scholars. As discussed in the previous chapters, it is this
typical constellation corporation that can lead to conflicts of interests. Without
effective control mechanisms, the top managers may pursue their own interests and
take the actions that deviate from those of shareholders.
The characteristics of corporate governance mechanisms can be classified as
internal and external. Internal characteristics in the developed market economies
focus on the role and functions of ownership structure, boards of directors, CEO
duality, and directors and executive compensation. External characteristics concern
the effectiveness of the managerial labor market, the market for corporate control, and
government regulations. 176 In different systems of corporate governance, there are
different characteristics. In this part, we focus on the characteristics both in Canadian
175 Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. "A Survey of Corporate Governance." Journal ofFinance, 52 (1997),
737-783
176 See Cannella, A.A., & Monroe, MJ. 1997. Contrasting Perspectives on Strategic Leader: Towards
a More Realistics view oftop managers. Journal of Management, Vol. 23, No.3. : 213-238.
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system and Chinese system.
1. Characteristics of Corporate Governance Mechanisms in Canada
This section appraises the efficacy of the main governance mechanisms operating
in the Canadian corporate governance. Besides the legislation and institutional
investor introduced in this thesis, we mainly touch the internal mechanisms of control
as principal topic.
Internal mechanisms of corporate governance aim primarily at coping with the
agency problem between shareholders and directors. Directors are elected by the
shareholders and represent the interests of the shareholders in corporate performance.
This is a type of 'principal-agent relationship,:177 the shareholders are the 'principals'
and the officers and directors are their 'agents'. Corporate directors and officers are
required to perform in the best interests of the corporation, and that means the best
interests of its legal owners - the shareholders. There is increased liability imposed
on directors and officers in Canada in recent years. 178 The rational for this liability is
that directors must have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance with a
view to protect the shareholder value.
Foerster and Grossl 79 point out in their study that the average size ofthe board of
directors for Canadian firms decreased in the past few years. The average percentage
of independent directors on the audit committee remained relatively stable in each
successive year. Study shows that around two-thirds of directors on the board of
directors of Canadian firms were independent with the average increasing annually. I so
177 See Daniels, R. 1. and Morek, R. Canadian Corporate Governance Policy Options, Working paper
1996.
178 Ibid
179 Foerster, Stephen R., Gross, R., Shapiro, D. and Toner, M., 2004, General Trends on Corporate
Governance Practices Amongst Canadian Firms: 1999 - 2001 A preliminary analysis of select
governance data for Canadian firms, For Industry Canada. Working paper.
180 Ibid
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Some empirical studies suggest that firms whose CEO is also the chair of the
board of directors have poorer performance than firms where the two positions are
separated. 181 The joint CEO/Chairperson position is a distinct characteristic of
Canadian firms. Studies show that CEOs chaired more than two-fifths of Canadian
boards. 182
2. Characteristics of Corporate Governance Mechanisms in China
During the initial phase of transforming the socialist planned economies, an
insider control model of corporate governance can often be produced when people
privatize of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) combined with introducing an equity
market. The later would serve as the market for corporate control, that is, as an
instrument for corporate governance and, hence, as an effective mechanism for raising
the external finance much needed by privatized enterprises for their restructuring
projects. 183 This kind of insider control model of corporate governance can be
incarnated in China is the Chinese "Key-man" model of corporate governance
mentioned above.
One of the major characteristics of the corporation In the world today is the
separation of ownership and managerial control which have generated serious
potential conflicts of interest among various stakeholders.184 During the period of
Chinese economic transformation from socialist plan-oriented economy to the
socialist market-oriented economy, it is of increased significance to study the
corporate governance mechanisms of Chinese firms. In this part, the major objective
is to analyze several internal corporate governance mechanisms of companies in the
18 I Fuerst and Kang 2000; Berg and Smith 1978
182 See Foerster, Stephen R., Gross, R., Shapiro, D. and Toner, M., 2004
183 Aoki, M & Kim, H. K. 1995. Corporate governance in Transition economies. Finance &
Development, September 20-22, at 20.
184 See Chen, X.H. & Lau, C.M. 2000. Enterprise Reform: Afocus on State-owned Enterprises. In C.M.
Lau & J.E Shen (eds), China Review 2000: 191-207. Hong: Chinese University Press.
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Chinese context, particularly the listed companies.
The characteristics of corporate governance mechanism can be concluded as the
following aspects: firstly, the level of shareholders' participation in corporate
governance is low due to the lack of philosophy and mechanisms for common
governance to facilitate their extensive involvement; secondly, SOEs in China are in
period of transition from planning to market economy. The phenomenon of "control
by insiders" is rampant; the supervision board has little influence on corporate
governance. China's model is a mixed model of corporate governance. This hybrid
model captures the characteristic of Anglo-Saxon model, which focuses on managers'
self-realization of internal motivation and control, while the financial institutional
environments are more like those in Japan and Germany in their early days.185
III The Bases of Divergence Between Canadian and Chinese Systems
ofCorporate Governance
Before we discuss the ongoing comparison and convergence between the two
systems of corporate governance, we should analyze the main divergence in the
development of corporate governance in Canada and in China which lies in the
difference in basic economic, cultural and sociological ideologies. For example, the
cultural differences have been core elements for both convergence argument and the
third degree path dependence argument. In addition, the importance of the cultural
differences based upon the cultural value and historical incidents that created
traditional systems have been highly recognized as two critical elements that affect
~ I· f d·· I 186lormu atlOn 0 tra ItlOna corporate governance systems.
185 Jing, Lihua, Zhou, Wenqun and Yuen-ching Tse, Corporate Governance in China: Ethical and
Legal Problems Work Paper, City University of Hong Kong.
186 See Licht, (2001).
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Professor Colin Mayerl87 has generally classified corporate governance systems
onto two: outsider-based and insider-based systems. The first depends on active
external markets for shares which include the market for corporate control through
takeovers. The second has more stable long-term shareholder relations with other
companies holding shares and does not depend on external markets. The mam
difference between the Canadian system of corporate governance and Chinese one is
that the first could be described as having an almost outsider-based system of
corporate control, by contrast, the latter could be characterized as having a similar
insider-based system. In an outsider system, corporate control is affected primarily
through the takeover system, has large equity markets, dispersed ownership and active
markets in corporate control. However, compared with standard outsider-based
system, Canadian system is characterized by concentrated ownership. Chinese
insider-based system of corporate governance is also not a standard insider-based
system, but an insider control system, where there is a vacuum filled by existing
management. 188 This system can be called the "keyman model system,,189 or has
some inadequacies of "keyman model", including: 1. management and control power
held in one person's hands, 2. lack of accountability, 3. pursue one's own interest
instead of maximizing shareholders' values.
Despite all divergence between the two systems of corporate governance, we also
point that not all divergence reflects inefficiency. Efficient divergence can arise either
through adaptation to local social structures or through fortuity. It could survive for a
considerable period of time. Still, though the rate of change may be slower, there is
good reason to believe that even the extent of efficient divergence, like the extent of
187 C. Mayer, Stock Market. Financial Institutions and Corporate Governance. in N. Dimsdale and M.
Preveser (eds), Capital Market and Corporate Governance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994, at 179.
188 See On Kit Tam, The Development o/Corporate Governance in China. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham,
UK, 1999, at 32.
189 Some Chinese scholars call this "keyman model" "one-man rule". An all-powerful CEO (general
manager) dominates the control and management of Chinese firms. Both company law and company
charters stipulate that CEOs are to be elected by the shareholders' meeting. But in practice the process
often involves the controlling shareholder (generally the state) appointing the board chairman and CEO
and notifying other shareholders accordingly.
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inefficient divergence, will continue to decrease relatively quickly.190
1. Path Dependence
The goal of a system of good corporate governance is to maximize the firm value
and create benefits for shareholders, as well as for the public in general. As we have
seen in this thesis that the corporate ownership and governance differ greatly between
the Canadian system of corporate governance and Chinese system of corporate
governance. During the half century since the Second World War, economic growth,
business practices, and living standards have changed both in Canada and In China.
But their corporate structures have remained different. Especially since the economic
reform in China, international comparison proves that despite immense difference
between the two systems of corporate governance, both economies perform very well.
The system of corporate governance of one country develops to respond to the
needs of particular national economy, as well as the historical and judicial
development. Where one aspect of corporate governance is less developed in a state
system, the resulting inefficiencies are counterbalanced by efficiencies elsewhere, so
to keep the respective system working efficiently in its respective historical, social
and political environment. 191
The reasons can be shed light on by showing that there are significant sources of
path dependence in a country's patterns of corporate ownership structure. l92 Bebchuk
and Roe argues that history has sowed considerable divergence into national systems
which are "path-dependent" and, hence, unlikely to converge at least in the
190 See Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman, The end of history for corporate law Georgetown Law
Journal. Washington: Jan 200 I. Vol. 89, Iss. 2; pg. 439, 30 pgs
191 See Mark J. Roe, Path Dependence, Political Options, and Governance Systems in Klaus 1. Hopt &
Eddy Wymeersch (eds.), Comparative Corporate Governance ~ Essays and Materials (Berlin Walter
de Gruyter, 1997), at 167.
192 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark J. Roe, A theOlY ofPath Dependence in Corporate Ownership
and Governance. This paper can be downloaded from the Social Science Research Network electronic
library at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=192414(accessdate:Jan.13,2004),atI.
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medium-term, notwithstanding pressure from the capital markets. There are two
sources of path dependence. 193 One type of path dependence is structure-driven path
dependence, in which initial ownership structures in an economy directly influence
subsequent ownership structures;194 the other type of path dependence is rule-driven
path dependence in which such rules can influence corporate ownership and
governance structures. 195
2. Impact of Cultural Factors on Corporate Governance
Canadian value system is based with the primary considerations being: rights,
justice and utility. However, Sino-Confucian areas, on the other hand, have value
systems based on the primacy of duty. In China this duty is owed particularly to
family, with the aged being accorded more respect.
In this section, we will not do a comprehensive review of Canadian and Chinese
culture. Instead we will give an overview of cultural highlights which impact
corporate governance in the two countries profoundly.
Culture refers to the set of beliefs shared by members of a society or group as to
how things ought to be. 196 Thes e shared beliefs emanate from institutions such as
school systems and religious organizations as well as family relationships. Culture has
a significant impact in the molding of a system of corporate governance because
corporations are run by persons of different cultural backgrounds. Economic
explanations are more convincing if they acknowledge culture. 197 Culture also has a
pervasive influence on corporate performance and institutional behaviors. Harrison
193 For detail of the two sources of path dependence, see Bebchuk and Roe (1999).
194 See Bebchuk and Roe (1999)
195 Bebchuk and Roe (1999)
196 See Schein, E.H. (1992) Organizational Culture and Leadership: A Dynamic View. Jossey Bass,
San Francisco, p.7-12.
197 See G. Redding, The Spirit ofChinese Capitalism (Walter de Gruyter & Co., Berlin, 1990) at 14.
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and Huntington (2000) have provided compelling evidence that national cultures and
values shape human progress and influence economic prosperity. 198 Japanese system
of corporate governance is one of an example of the influence of cultural factors.
When talking about the Japanese corporate governance, one may summarize a few
distinctive characteristics including "groupism", "familism", "lifetime employment"
and the ideology that a corporation should be motivated towards national service
rather than profit maximization. These characteristics have deep roots in Japanese
culture. 199 It is clear from the experience of the Canada and China that cultural
characteristics have a significant impact on their corporate governance systems
respectively and have traditionally provided the foundations of corporate governance
in countries with respective system.
a). Canada
Based on the pre-industrial history - a French colony of resource extraction built
around the fur trade, and then a French and a British colony of settlement,200 Canada
can be described as a multicultural society whose racial and ethnic diversity is
expressed in different ways. Study showed that Canada inherited from her French
colonial history a disposition to mercantilist policies that invite official abuse, which
led Canada to be a remarkably corrupt country until a few generations ago.201 A
remarkable pattern in Canadian corporate control is also affected by this kind of
colony. A slight predominance of family controlled pyramidal business groups
supplemented by a large phalanx of freestanding widely-held firms is popular in
Canada today which is similar to its original pattern a century age.
198 Harrison, L. E., & Huntington, S. P. (Eds.) (2000). Culture matters: How values shape human
progress. New York: Basic Books.
199 H. Hazama, Industrialization and Groupism, in K. Nakagawa (ed.) Social Order and
Entrepreneurship (Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 1977) at 199-223. See also 1. Hirschmeier,
Entrepreneurs and the Social Order: America, Germany and Japan, 1887-1900, in K. Nakagawa (ed.),
Social Order and Entrepeneurship, at 202, 203.
200 Morek, Randall, Michael Percy, Gloria Tian, and Bernard Yeung. 2004. The Rise and Fall of the
Widely Held Firm: A History of corporate Ownership in Canada. National Bureau of Economic
Research Working Paper.
201 Ibid.
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A case In point is Canada where historic conflict between francophone and
anglophone residents has culminated in the rise of a movement for political
independence in the predominantly French-speaking province of Quebec.202 While
French-English conflict in Canada has taken on many forms in the past two hundred
years, corporate culture and performance sometimes can reflect the conflict. It is
broadly recognized that this cross-cultural factors act as invisible barriers in good
corporate performance in Canada, especially in Quebec province. In recent years, a
vigorous immigration policy has attracted a growing number of applicants from
non-traditional sources. Canada's cultural diversity is manifest at the level of ethnic
and immigrant composition. With the immigration of population from non-traditional
sources, Canada inevitably absorbs some ideas of corporate governance from
non-Canadian sources which influence the existing corporate governance system.
b). China
China's early cultural background is similar to that of Japan which was a feudal
society with well-established social order under Confucian doctrines. Confucius has
been the most powerful influence shaping the Chinese culture and Chinese society.
Although Confucianism lacks either a deity or an organization, Confucian doctrines
permeate the lives of Chinese peoples around the world. He emphasizes benevolence,
goodness and humaneness. Confucianism prescribes a strict hierarchal order and
harmony. Members of an organization are ordered to respect, abide by a leading
authority, even a leading person. Two basic moral principles formed the essence of
Confucianism - loyalty to the emperor and filial piety. The former requires the loyalty
to the nation; and the latter requires the obligation to the family. Loyalty and filial
piety extended to all the social relations even penetrate the today's corporate
governance. Bureaucracy is a product when applying this idea to government
organization. However, it causes disastrous effect on practicing corporate governance
202 Fenwicik R., (1982), Etimic Culture and Economic Structure: Determinants of French English
Earnings Inequality in Quebec. Journal Title: Social Forces. Volume: 61. Issue: I
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in China.
China's recent cultural background is the enforcement of the principles of
Leninist democratic centralism in the People's Republic of China. The effect of the
two similar cultural traditions is an ingrained tradition of recognizing the norm of an
authoritarian leader within the organization or clan. The prevalent in Chinese culture
is a tradition of insiders vs. outsiders with a built-in convention of secrecy among
insiders.203
In the past fifty years, Chinese society has changed significantly. Some traditional
components of Chinese beliefs have been abandoned along the way. Benevolence and
goodness has less value now, while hierarchy or authority is still dominating in
Chinese culture.204 With respect to the impact of socialist culture on Chinese system
of corporate governance, China has more than 50 years of socialist culture in which
worker were told that they were the real masters of the country and also the masters of
their enterprises which belong to the state. Many Chinese workers want to participate
positively in corporate governance. The modern theory of separation of corporate
ownership and management can not be widely accepted by most of the Chinese
workers at the beginning of economic reform. The conflicts between capital and
labors are counter-productive and may destabilize society.205
In addition to national culture, other kinds of cultures such as professional culture
and foreign culture may also have an influence on the corporate performance. The
rapid Chinese booming economy during the past two decade and its accession to the
WTO has placed China among the major international business players. Although
corporate governance has increasingly become key point of corporate operations in a
203 See Cyril Lin, Corporatisation and Corporate Governance in China s Economic Transition,
Economics of Planning 34: 5-35, 2001. Kluwer Academic Publishers.
204 See Jing, Lihua, Zhou, Wenqun and Yuen-ching Tse, Corporate Governance in China: Ethical
and Legal Problems Work Paper, City University of Hong Kong.
205 Wei, Yuwa, Comparative Corporate Governance, A Chinese Perspective, (Kluwer Law
International, 2003), p.186.
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globalized economic environment, a lack of general knowledge of different cultures
and cultural competency remains a hindrance in corporate governance improvement,
including those between Western cultures and China.206
In sum, we can conclude that, one hand, the actual practice of Chinese system of
corporate governance bears many of characteristics of the legacy of the above Chinese
cultural tradition; another hand, China's economic reforms have also created a real
challenge to many traditional culture which impacts the present corporate governance
system vice verse. Its culture is quite different to the western countries as well as the
countries of the former Soviet bloc, which have undergone a rapid transition from a
planned economy to a market economy. Adoption of the modern corporate form for
SOEs in China was grafted onto an ideological position that remained essentially
collectivist and socialist in its outlook.207
3. Historical Legal Development on Corporate Governance
Laws and the quality of the enforcement of courts in one country are essential
elements of corporate governance.208 Legal systems of most countries derive from
relatively few "legal families," including the English (common law), the French, and
the German, the latter two is civil law which derived from the Roman Law. In the
19th century, these systems spread throughout the world through conquest,
colonization, and voluntary adoption. Apart from the two main "legal families",
Socialist countries had a legal tradition based on former Soviet law.
Because legal origins are highly correlated with the content of the law and
because legal families originated before financial markets had developed, it is
206 Chen, L. and Sheer V. C., Successful Sino-Western Business Negotiation: Participants' Accounts of
National and Professional Cultures, The Journal of Business Communication, Vol. 40, 2003.
207 For the detailed ideological context within which enterprise reform in China has been pursued, see
Crane, G., Globalization in China 4(2) New Political Economy (1995), at 215.
208 See La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1997. Legal determinants of
external finance. Jo urnal of Finance 52, 1131-1150 for detai I.
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unlikely that laws were written primarily in response to market pressures. Rather, the
legal families appear to shape the legal rules, which in turn influence financial
markets.209
Engla nd and its former colonies, including the U.S., Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and many countries in Africa and South East Asia, have the common law
system. France and many French colonies, including Dutch, Belgian, and Spanish
colonies and Quebec province in Canada have the French civil law system. Germany,
Germanic countries in Europe, and a number of countries in East Asia are influenced
by the German civil law tradition. The Scandinavian countries form their own
tradition.
Socialist countries had a legal tradition based on Soviet law, but because the laws
of these countries are changing rapidly during the transition out of socialism, La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) do not consider them.
a). Canada
The historical legal development root of Canadian corporate governance can be
derived from British law and practice. Even the province of Quebec, which uses the
Napoleonic Code civile as the root of its commercial law, has adopted similar forms
of corporate structure and governance of other Canadian provinces. For example, the
first major company in Canada was the Hudson's Bay Company, which was
incorporated in London as a joint-stock company in 1670. In 1867, the four colonies
of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Lower Canada (Quebec) and Upper Canada
(Ontario) were united as a new Dominion of the British Empire through the British
North America (BNA) Act, now called the Constitution Act (1867).
209 See La Porta R. et aI., Investor Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 Journal of Financial
Economics 3 (2000).
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b). China
China was an agricultural society with a sophisticated commercial system but no
idea of a corporation as a legal individual before the legal concept of the corporation
was imported into China at the end of the nineteenth century. The first corporate
legislation in Chinese history - the Great Qing Commercial Code was enacted in
January 1904, during Qing Dynasty. Out of 140 articles, the Commercial Code
contained 131 articles concerning company matters. The Republic government
promulgated the Company Regulations in 1914. From 1927 the Nationalist
government ruled China. The new government promulgated a Company Law in 1929.
This was the first comparatively complete legislation concerning companies in
Chinese history.2 1o In 1949, due to the importation of the highly centralized economy
model from the former Soviet Union by the People's Republic of China, business
companies gradually disappeared. During this period, the development of the
corporate legislation in China was very slow. In the late 1970s, with the introduction
of a market economy in China, the efforts were continually made to improve the
performance of state owned enterprises. These included contracting out, leasing, and
joint operation. However, all these efforts did not solve the problems of SOEs. The
definition of ''juristic person" was firstly introduced by Economic Contract Law in
1981, and then by Civil Code in 1986. The defect of the two laws is that it only
provides for a person, representative of a juristic person, but does not specify the
internal organization. This defect has its historical causes.
Since the Company law was enacted in 1994, SOEs were redefined as business
companies, and private companies were incorporated since then. The Company Law
of 1994 prescribes a relatively detailed outline of corporatisation in China.
210 Xu Y, Principles a/Company Law, Publishing House of Law, Beijing (1997) at 16.
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4. Other Bases of Divergence
a). Differences of Firms and Market
As discussed above, although China's Company Law of 1994 follows the old
Continental style of company legislation, the 1994 Company Law has the following
distinctive features which are different from the western company laws as well as
from the former Soviet-bloc company law: (a) Two types of company can be formed
with private capital prescribed by company law: Limited Liability Company and Joint
Stock Company. They bear some resemblance to private and public companies in
Canada, but there are some differences. A limited liability company must have
between two and fifty shareholders211 and cannot offer its shares to the public.
Shareholders have preemptive rights over any sale of shares by another shareholder.212
Joint Stock Companies (JSCs, sometimes referred to as companies limited by shares)
are designed to allow capital to be raised through either by sponsorship or public
share offer.213 (b) The Chinese concept of the legal personality of a company differs
from Canadian model. This is most apparent in two areas. First, every company must
have a "legal representative", who is the natural person authorized to act on behalf of
the company.214 Second, the company law provides that the state assets of a company
belong to the State. This provision has resulted from confusion over the ownership
rights of the state in the SOEs' reform. (c) There is more extensive reliance on
mandatory rules in the structure of Chinese company law than the case in common
211 See Art. 20 and 45 ofCLPRC (The Company Law ofthe People:S Republic ofChina)
212 See Art. 35 of CLPRC. It prescribes that transfer of his share of capital contribution by a
shareholder to anyone other than another shareholder is subject to consent by a m~ority of all the
shareholders; shareholders who do not consent to the transfer shall purchase the share of capital
contribution to be assigned, and failure by those shareholders to make such purchase is deemed to
be their consent to the assignment. Where the shareholders consent to the assignment of share of
capital contribution, other shareholders have the preemptive right of purchase under the same
conditions.
213 See Art. 74 ofCLPRC
214 Normally, the chairman of the board is the legal representative of the company.
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law jurisdictions, indicating a rejection of the contractarian model of company law. (d)
Despite the rejection of a contractarian model of company law apparent in the heavy
reliance on mandatory rules, the Articles of Association215 have a contractual status
that appears to be even more extensive than the concept of the "s" and "d"
contracts,,216 in the Canada. The latter is a contract between the directors and
shareholders and between shareholders inter se. (e) Chinese companies are required to
limit their business to that described in the scope of business at the time of registration
(or as subsequently amended). Contracts outside the scope of business are illegal
contracts and therefore not enforceable. (f) The participation of workers in companies
is ensured through the requirement for JSCs to have a supervisory board that includes
worker representatives217. The board of directors is accountable to the supervisory
board, whose members are entitled to attend meeting of the board of directors in a
non-voting capacity. The Company Law also requires the Board of Directors to
consult employees and trade unions on matters affecting their interests
China is distinctive in that it has produced regulations over market forces with
regard to a number of issues, i.e. the separation of regulation of the main financial
sectors. This separation is regarded to be a characteristic of its regulatory system in
China. The China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) is designated as the
regulator for securities activities. The Securities Law provides wide-ranging powers
to the CSRC with regard to authorization, rule making, investigation and enforcement
of all aspects of the securities market. In the past, the Central Bank (People's Bank
of China) had been responsible for the entire system of financial regulation.
Following the Asian financial crisis of 1998, the government began to restructure the
financial system and pursued a policy of separation of regulation of the four main
215 See Art. 790fCLPRC.
216 The Shareholder Contract ('s' Contract) and the Directors' Contract ('d' Contract). See Jason W.
Neyers, Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-piercing, and the Private Law Model Corporation, University
of Toronto Law Journal - Volume L, Number 2, Spring 2000. The first of these relationships is the
contract between the original shareholders. The second relationship that establishes limited liability is
the contract between the directors and the totality of shareholders.
217 SeeArt.124ofCLPRC.
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financial sectors - banking, securities, insurance and trust. This changed structure in
the financial market was regarded as an important part of economic reform in China.
This resulted in the emergence of the CSRC in its current form, the creation of a new
regulator for the insurance sector (China Insurance Regulatory Commission, CIRC)
and the limitation of the regulatory role of the central bank to banking and trust
business.
Financial markets, and in particular the legal and regulatory environment In
which they operate, are closely related to the development of national systems of
corporate governance.218 The results of academic study showed that the national legal
environment had a deep influence on the size and extent of a country's capital
markets.219
b). Political Base of Divergence
With regard to divergence of corporate governance systems, most study
researches focus on the quality of corporate law, private bonding mechanisms, legal
culture, and economic competition. Most peoples neglect the politics as an important
base of divergence of corporate governance. It is not that people don't know politics
matters, but rather most experts don't build it in systematically into explanations.22o
With regard to the influence of politics on corporate governance, some studies are
in favor of the point of positive influence that markets drive governance, and markets
are politically determined; thus, politics drives corporate governance. Roe stresses the
relationship between the politics and ownership separation.221 Roe argues in his book
218 See, La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., "Legal determinants of
external finance" 52 Jnl of Finance 1131-1150 (1997) and A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, "A survey of
corporate governance" 52(2) Jnl ofFinance 737-783 (1997).
219 See the conclusion of See, La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silane, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W., "Legal
determinants of external finance" 52 Jnl ofFinance 1l31-1150 (1997).
220 Peter Gourevitch, Richard Carney, Michael Hawes Testing Political Explanations of Corporate
Governance Patterns, February 8, 9, 2003. Conference on Economics, Political Institutions, and
Financial Markets Social Science History Institute Stanford University.
221 Mark 1. Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance Political Context, Corporate
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that where social democracy is strong, shareholder rights are weak, and shareholder
diffusion is low. 222 Paga no and Volpin 223 analyze the political determinants of
investor and employment protection. They predict that proportional electoral systems
are conducive to weaker investor protection and stronger employment protection than
majoritarian systems. They note that the structure of political institutions might
influence the victory of coalitions. They compare worker-manager vs. owner alliances
and note that corporatist systems may facilitate these. The argument can be extended
and systemized.224
In Chinese context, Chinese politics and economies are undergoing rapid changes;
however the traditional single party rule is not changed. This political system deeply
influences its corporate governance. Coalition politics involving alliances of disparate
groups will be the scenario of the western both in Parliament and the state assemblies.
Coalitions are a type of competitive politics in most countries. Just as competition in a
market economy leads to better production and services. Competitive coalition
politics should in theory at least lead to better corporate governance in one country.
Another characteristic of Chinese politics is that the working class has been the
leading class in China since the New China was established in 1949, and workers are
regarded as owners and enjoy democratic rights in China's SOEs and can participate
in all operations and decision-making of the enterprise. Labor disputes over enterprise
management in the past and money, benefits today, often peppered with charges of
official corruption due to present political system, have become frequent as China
Impact (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). Roe argues in this book that all the major
variables that shape the incentives structuring corporate governance derive from conditions set by
politics.
222 Roe's ownership structure is based on the social democracy.
223 Pagano, Marco and Volpin, Paolo F., "The Political Economy of Corporate Governance" (October
1999). AFA 2002 Atlanta Meetings; Univ. of Salerno Working Paper No. 29.
http://ssrn.com/abstract=209314 (access date: Jul. 19,2004).
224 See Peter Gourevitch, Richard Carney, Michael Hawes Testing Political Explanations ofCorporate
Governance Patterns. February 8, 9, 2003. Conference on Economics, Political Institutions, and
Financial Markets Social Science History Institute Stanford University.
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seeks to streamline or shed its bloated SOEs. This trend indicates that the workers
focus on the individual profits other than the status of the owners. In line with China's
following reform of its SOEs, the shareholders, not the workers, will become the
decision-makers of the future state-owned or state-held corporations. Furthermore,
with the privatization of China's SOEs, the owner's theory of working class has been
weakened today.225
IV Stock Exchange as Corporate Regulators in Canada and in China
First, Canada does not have a national securities commission. Securities
regulation is carried out at the provincial and territorial level; while the Canadian
securities laws are uniform across all the provinces and territories which are
substantially similar to those in China; The second divergence is that a much higher
percentage of Canadian public companies have a controlling shareholder which is
different from the controlling shareholder in Chinese companies - the state. The
controlling shareholder in Chinese companies is continually to decrease it percentage;
The third divergence is that many Canadian public companies have relatively low
market capitalization. For those companies, the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX)226
corporate governance would be a very significant financial and administrative burden.
It seems that these companies have limited capacity to attract more independent
directors.
225 However, according to the statement of Chinese government: "Workers are still owners of the SOEs.
But that doesn't mean all workers will participate in all operations and decision-making of the
enterprise, or they would rely on the enterprise and the nation forever."
226 The TSE has changed the composition of its Board. This body includes now 15 directors comprised
of 7 members from participating organizations, 7 other independent members and the President of the
Exchange. The independence of the Board has been the paramount consideration in adopting this new
composition. The Board has five sub-committees on its governance which includes Finance and Audit,
human Resources, Strategic Policy and Regulation. Three other committees on Stock List, Trading
Policy and Hearing also fulfill distinct duties. For more detail, see TSE's annual report.
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1. The TSX's Role in Shaping Corporate Governance
As the third largest in North America and the eighth largest in the world,227 the
TSX has made important steps in the field of Canadian system of corporate
governance emphasizing the relationship between corporate governance and investor
confidence. In the early 1990's, the TSX commissioned a major report that examined
the state of corporate governance in Canada. 228 Canada's stock exchanges and
self-regulating professions must monitor the resulting pattern of behavior and decide
whether and when it may be beneficial to make certain provisions mandatory within
their areas of competence.229 Its leadership role in Canada is illustrated through two
considerable studies on corporate governance that it has sponsored: sponsorship of
1994 study of Canadian corporate governance by the Dey Commission, which
produced the landmark report,230 named "Where were the directors", in which the
Exchange adopted 14 recommendations as "best practices" guidelines and require
listed companies to annually disclose the extent to which they comply with these
corporate governance guideline. The second report is a study "Five Years to the DEY"
which measured the impact of the 14 guidelines proposed in Dey Report.
a). Dey Report
Over the past 10 years, the topic of corporate governance has become more and
more important. The first comprehensive and relatively recent discussion of enhanced
corporate governance seems to be the 1994 report, Where Were the Directors?
Guidelines for Improved Corporate Governance in Canada (the "Dey Report,,).231
227 See TSX Group 2002 Annual Report.
228 In I995, as a result of this report, the TSX adopted I4 non-mandatory corporate governance best
practices which required Canadian incorporated listed companies to annually disclose their corporate
governance practices, comparing their practices to the best practices.
229 1. A. Levin, Canadian Corporate Governance Developments. Working paper at
http://www.fasken.com
230 See Toronto Stock Exchange Annual Report I999.
231 Report of the Toronto Stock Exchange Commission on Corporate Governance in Canada,
Decem ber I994.
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Corporate governance has been described as "the process and structure used to direct
and manage the business and affairs of the corporation with the objective of
enhancing shareholder value,,232.
The Dey Report pointed out the need for improved corporate governance in
publicly-traded corporations. It also led to the Toronto Stocks Exchange (the "TSE")
adopting what were then viewed as extensive corporate governance guidelines for
effective corporate governance. 233 However, implementation of the guidelines is
voluntary, and a key goal of the guidelines is to describe the corporate governance
system in place at each of the corporations, so as to allow shareholders to assess the
appropriateness and effectiveness of each firm's corporate governance system?34
b). Saucier Report
The Joint Committee on Corporate Governance ("JCCG") released its report,
Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture?35 The Saucier Report is broad
ranging and emphasizes the importance of good corporate governance. It outlines 15
recommendations focused on specific areas where action can be taken aimed at
improving the effectiveness of governance in Canadian public corporations, such as
the condition of listing on a Canadian stock exchange, all boards should have an
independent board leader chosen by the full board who is accountable for activities
including succession planning and responsible for leading regular meetings that
include outside directors and exclude management.
The Saucier Report recommended certain changes to TSX's corporate governance
guidelines and the introduction of a new condition of continued listing that would
232 See Dey Report, 1994: 7.
233 See TSX Company Manual, section 473
234 Bujahi, M. and McConamy, B.J., Corporate governance: Factors influencing voluntary disclosure
by publicly traded Canadian Firms, Canadian Accounting Perspectives, Toronto 2002, Vol. 1, Iss. 2.
235 The Joint Committee on Corporate Governance (known as the "Saucier Committee" for its chair,
Guylaine Saucier) issued its final report entitled "Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance
Culture" in November, 2001.
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require the board of every TSX listed company to have an "independent board leader"
who would perform certain functions described in the Saucier Report. This Report
proposes recommendations to strengthen the TSE Guidelines and the role of boards
and committees in oversight, reporting, risk management and internal controls.
b). Multilateral Instruments
Effective March 30, 2004, the Canadian Securities Administrators made
amendments to various national and multilateral instruments ("MI") that will have an
impact, either directly or indirectly, upon certain TSX Venture Exchange Policies.
These instruments include Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification ofDisclosure
in Issuer s Annual and Interim Filings ("MI 52-109"); and Multilateral Instrument
52-110 Audit Committees ("MI 52-110"). The financial statement certification
requirements prescribed by MI 52-109 and the responsibilities and certain disclosure
requirements applicable to audit committees, as prescribed by MI 52-110, will apply
to all Issuers. On February 4, 2005 members of the Canadian Securities
Administrators, other than British Columbia, released proposals for one new
instrument (MI 52-Ill) and one revised instrument (MI 52-109). These Instruments
deal with regulations pertaining to the certification and reporting on disclosure
controls and internal controls over financial reporting. According to these instruments,
upon listing on the Exchange, and in accordance with applicable Securities Laws,
every issuer becomes a reporting issuer.
The corporate governance practices already include a number of the reforms
recently adopted and proposed by TSX in Canada. In September 2003, the TSX
announced it was relinquishing responsibility for setting corporate governance
standards to provincial securities regulators.236 0 n October 29,2004, TSX published
for comment its proposal to replace its current corporate governance requirement with
236 See Stephane Rousseau, Ie rofe des tribunaux et du conseif d'administration dans fa gouvernance
des societes ouvertes : reflexions sur la regIe dujugement d'affaires, Les Cahiers de Droit, vol. 45, no.
3, septem bre 2004, at 503.
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the requirement for issuers to disclose corporate governance practices in accordance
with NI 58-101. As a result, TSX has proposed to remove its guidelines and
disclosure requirement for corporate governance.
2. Chinese Stock Exchange's Role in Shaping Corporate Governance
Stock companies and stock markets did not exist until the late 1980s when the
Chinese government decided to restructure the industrial sector then dominated by
SOEs. A department store in Beijing was given permission for issuing shares in 1984,
the very first time since the founding of the People's Republic in 1949. Shareholders
were confined, however, solely to the employees of the store. A more direct cause of
this bold step was the heavy losses incurred by SOEs. In the following few years,
more SOEs were "incorporated" through selling shares to their own employees or
other stock companies and SOEs. New joint stock companies were organized in a
similar way. Stock trading was also prohibited and low liquidity of stocks made it
difficult for the companies to market their initial offerings. Consequently, curb
markets emerged in several large cities. To end the chaotic black-market trading, in
the drive to achieve a modern enterprise system, the State Council decided in 1989 to
introduced two national stock exchanges into its centrally planned economy. The
Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was inaugurated in December of 1990, and the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) opened in July, 1991.237 The regulation authority
is the China Securities Regulation Commission (CSRC), founded in October 1992.
a). Guideline on the Management of Listed Companies
According to the introduction, the Guideline aims at encouraging domestically
listed companies to establish and develop a modern enterprise system; regulating the
operations of domestically listed companies; and promoting the healthy development
237 The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) was established in 1984 and officially opened in December
1990. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SlE) was established in 1987 and officially opened on 3 July
1991. Separating the stock market into two stock exchanges aims at encouraging competition between
them.
84
of PRC securities market.
The guideline represents a significant step forward for the proper governance of
Chinese listed companies. Adopting most of the international best practices, The
Chinese corporate governance framework represents one of the most comprehensive
and demanding frameworks in the world. The effectiveness of these requirements in
ensuring a good corporate governance framework will depend on effective practical
implementation.
The Guideline sets out the basic principles on the governance of domestically
listed companies, the measures needed for protecting the interests ofthe investors, the
behavior and professional ethics of the directors, members of the supervisory board
and executive staff ofthe listed companies.
V Developments of the Canadian and Chinese systems of corporate
governance
Over the past few years, corporate governance has become a topic of substantial
concern for all corporate participants including shareholders, boards of directors,
management teams and employees. The fallout from a series of high profile corporate
recent failures in the United States influences the development of corporate
governance world-widely. The introduction of sweeping legislative and regulatory
changes in Canada and China has led to a change in the way in which companies are
expected to govern themselves in both the two countries. In Canada, the most
significant developments have been the passing of Bill 198, Keeping the Promise for a
Strong Economy Act (Budget Measures), 2002 (Bill 198), proposed Ontario Securities
Commission rules promulgated pursuant to Bill 198 and proposed revised listing
standards and corporate governance guidelines of the Toronto Stock Exchange. In
China, The development of corporate governance depends on both the efforts at the
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individual company level to close the gap with global best perfonnance and the
legislation at the country level to guide the corporate governance implementation. The
most recent development in corporate governance in China is the promulgation of thr
corporate governance guidelines for listed companies.238
1. Canada
The 1994 report, "Where Were the Directors? Guidelines for Improved Corporate
Governance in Canada" (the "Dey Report '') is considered the first comprehensive
and relatively recent discussion of enhanced corporate governance in Canada. The
Dey Report was innovative when it first appeared and led to the TSX in 1995
adopting what were then viewed as extensive corporate governance guidelines.
Following the issuance of the Dey Report, the Saucier Committee issued its
interim report entitled "Beyond Compliance: Building a Governance Culture". The
Saucier Committee's report is broad ranging and emphasizes the importance of good
corporate governance. The Saucier Committee's report have largely been followed by
the TSX and reflected in the proposed disclosure requirements and amended
guidelines approved by the TSX board of directors on March 26, 2002.239 . On
November 28, 2002 the TSX updated the TSX Proposed Guidelines by issuing
proposed "Revised Requirements, Guidelines and Practice Notes ,,240. The TSX
Revised Guidelines offer the following comments relative to corporate governance, i.e.
difference between a "related director" who is a member of management, and an
"unrelated director" who is not a member of management; responsibility for the
stewardship of the board of directors of each company; audit committee composed
entirely of unrelated directors of each company;241 etc.
238 Promulgated by the CSRC on 7 January 2002 and effective from that date.
239 the "TSX Proposed Guidelines"
240 the "TSX Revised Guidelines"
241 See section 475(13) of the TSX Revised Guidelines.
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In September 2002, a report entitled "Governance, Values and Competitiveness -
A Commitment to Leadership" issued by the Canadian Council of Chief
Executives, 242 which contains some measures for the corporate governance
improvement, such as Certification, Legal Penalties Sanctions Within Compensation,
Access to Capital Markets, Ethics and Corporate Citizenship, Board Independence,
Board Leadership, Audit Committee, Equity Compensation, Transparency and
Disclosure, etc. In 2004, Canadian securities administrators introduced a series of new
rules that set out new standards with regard to certification of financial statements,
audit committee independence and auditor oversight.243
2. China
A report issued by CIPE244 prescribe that the need for corporate governance in
developing, emerging and transitional economies extends far beyond resolving
problems stemming from the separation of ownership and control. Developing and
emerging economies are constantly confronted with issues such as the lack of
property rights, the abuse of minority shareholders, contract violations, asset stripping
and self-dealing.
China, as one of the biggest emerging and transitional economies in the world
today, really has a rapid development of corporate governance which is necessary for
its emerging and transitional economies. In the mid-1980s corporate governance
started to gain wide interest and attention in China. The issue of which model of
corporate governance was right for this emerging market has become a highly
242 The full text of this report can be found at www.ceocouncil.ca.
243 Multilateral Instrument 52-108 Auditor Oversight, Multilateral Instrument 52-109 Certification of
Disclosure in Companies' Annual and Interim Filings, and Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Audit
Committees
244 The Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) is an affiliate of the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, established in 1983 to promote private enterprise and market-oriented reform worldwide.
See Instituting Corporate Governance in Developing, Emerging and Transitional Economies (March,
2002) at 9.
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sensitive one at that time in the academic field. It was widely believed that "one size
does not fit all", meaning neither the Anglo-Saxon model nor the Continental-German
model of corporate governance fit China and that an international code of best
practice is unworkable. Legal systems, business cultures and corporate structures are
just too different, even among developed nations. The GECD reflects this view in the
preamble to its "Principles of Corporate Governance", where it states: "There is no
single model of good corporate governance.,,245
Corporate governance is about maximizing value subject to meeting a
corporation's financial and other legal and contractual obligations.246 As a result,
corporate restructuring programs adopted by both the advanced economies and
emerging economies focuses on the expanded privatization and securitization policies
of stated-owned enterprises, the improvement of transparency levels in the operation
and behavior of listed companies, the establishment of efficient management and
the resolution of conflicts of interest among the different agents in the corporation.
Today, China is also facing pressures to become more integrated into the global
economy. What integration requires in practice is adopting programs of economic
liberalization and deregulation. As a result of these pressures, the government has
introduced reforms in several key areas with regards to corporate governance.
The process of competitive transformation in corporate governance practices is
already under way in China. CCP's the 4th meeting of 15th National Congress in 1999
has expressed its interest in the establishment of efficient corporate governance
practices in China by accepting the corporate governance as a core of modern
enterprises system, recognizing the importance of corporate governance in the
continuous development of Chinese system of corporate governance, almost
immediately following its announcement of the Guiding Opinion for Listed
245 DECD Principles of Corporate Governance, Preamble, at 2. (The Principles can be downloaded
from: www.oecd.org/daf/governance/principles.html)
246 See Corporate Governance: An issue of Global Concern. t he website of the World Bank at:
http://www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/privatesector/cg/aboutus.htm (access date: 7 January 2004).
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Companies on the Establishment of an Independent Non-Executive Directors
System, 247 th e Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission ("CSRC") issued a
consultation paper and the corresponding final version of Guideline on the
Management of Listed Companies on 11 September 2001 and 7 January 2002
. I 248respectIve y.
The People's Republic of China has been implementing a series of state owned
enterprise (SOE) reform policies since 1979. Its emphasis of reform turned to
changing the structure of enterprise ownership since 1992, China initiated the
"modern enterprise system,,,249 which aimed to transform the SOEs into modern
corporations. It involves the transformation of SOEs into shareholding corporations,
in which the owners elect a board of directors to monitor the daily operation of the
firm by professional managers. This ownership structure is intended to clarify the
property rights in SOEs and to free them from administrative interference. Some of
these corporations then go on to list shares on the Chinese stock exchanges in
Shanghai and Shenzhen. Since 1998, the government also encourages mergers and
acquisitions between SOEs as a new mean of SOE reform.
All these reforms have been considered quite successful with regard to
improvement in total factor productivity (TFP) by many scholars including Dollar
(1990), Jefferson, Rawski and Zhen (1992), Groves et al (1994, 1995). However,
other domestic scholars argue that the reform in which shareholding was introduced
247 The Guiding Opinion/or Listed Companies on the Establishment 0/an Independent Non-Executive
Directors System was announced on 16 August 2001 and requires that there be a minimum of two
independent non-executive directors on the board of a listed companies by 30 June 2002, and that the
number of independent non-executive directors be over one-third of the board of director by 30 June
2003.
248 This guidance is considered the most recent development in the legal framework of corporate
governance in China is the promulgation by the CSRC of corporate governance guidelines for listed
companies. The guidelines contain 95 articles and, once implemented, will represent a substantial
modernization of corporate governance in Chinese Listed companies.
249 The former leader, Mr. Deng Xiaoping, called for an introduction of the market economy in China
in 1992, one of the official goals of SOE reform was to set up a modern enterprise system in the
majority of large and medium-sized SOEs. SOE reform policy also accelerated the process of corporate
legislation, which was perceived as an essential legal instrument for corporatization of SOEs.
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represents a significant move away from socialism.
With respect to corporate governance, China's SOE reform has been relatively
successful in terms of solving the short-term managerial incentive problem; but in
terms of solving the management selection mechanism and the long-term managerial
incentive problem, this reform has it own defects.
Some strategies and theories were introduced to increase managerial incentives
and autonomy in SOE. In the beginning of SOE's reform, a contractual mechanism
was introduced into the enterprise system, under which the owner of an enterprise,
(usually the state of a governmental organization) agreed for a contractor (usually the
enterprise or another enterprise) to run it.25o As the above discussion of contract
theory of firm, the main idea behind this strategy is that independent and rational
individuals enter into voluntary and freely bargained contract, thereby forming the
institution of a firm. The purpose of this strategy was to introduce incentives into the
SOE's system in order to increase managerial efficiency by maximizing the total
income ofenterprises.
Another notable reform strategy was the introduction of a directors' liability
mechanism.251 Directors should faithfully perform their duties to the company and
should uphold the interests of the company. The directors should not use their position
to seek personal gain. Directors are forbidden from engaging in the business operation
of another company carrying out the same business as the company that he or she is
serving, and engaging in activities which may adversely affect the interests of the
company.252
250 Wei, Yuwa, Comparative Corporate Governance, A Chinese Perspective, (Kluwer Law
International, 2003), at 110.
251 Ibid at II I.
252 Company Law 1994, art 59,60, and 61
PART FOUR: CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE CANADIAN AND
CHINESE SYSTEMS
Convergence in national systems of corporate governance is a matter of some
disputes by integrating academic viewpoints, statistical evidence, as well as field
surveys. The debates are grouped into three categories: convergence into the direction
of the market-oriented model (with the Anglo-Saxon model as the reference base),
convergence towards another type of model, namely in the direction of a hybrid
corporate governance model (based on cross-reference between different leading
governance models), and diversity of corporate governance models (those that do not
believe in global convergence but adhere to diversity of governance models).253
Gilson gives the formal, functional and contractual change in the convergence of
different systems of corporate governance?54 Formal convergence involves change in
the legal infrastructure and therefore requires political support and resort to the
legislative process. This type of convergence is often associated with international
harmonization in the form of treaties, conventions or legislation; Functional
convergence occurs without any change in the legal infrastructure and the existing
legal system is sufficiently flexible to respond to new circumstances without resorting
to the legal change; Contractual convergence adopts the form of contract because
existing governance institutions lack the flexibility to respond without formal change,
and political barriers restrict the capacity for formal institutional change?55 Besides
the above three changes in the convergence of different systems of corporate
governance, the hybrid of formal and functional convergence can be seen in some
253 Lut gart Van den Berghe prescribes the three categories of convergence of national corporate
governance in her book: Corporate governance in a globalising world: convergence or divergence? : a
European perspective, (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002).
254 Ronald J. Gilson, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence ofForm or Function. Stanford
Law School Working Paper No. 192, May 2000, http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract id=2295 17
(access date: Aug. 16,2004).
255 Ibid. at 35.
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countries' systems of corporate governance.
I Possibility ofNational Corporate Governance Convergence
Hansmann and Kraakman 256 argue that there is a strong likelihood of
convergence towards a single governance model. They believe that there are three
principal factors driving economies towards consensus: the failure of alternative, the
competitive pressures of global commerce, and the shift of interest group influence in
favor of an emerging shareholder class. Convergence towards stronger legal
protection of investors is likely to result in increased investment and growth. It is not
clear whether or how quickly such convergence will occur. Convergence in other
aspects of corporate governance, such as board composition and ownership structure -
is evident in different corporate governance practices; however, other parts of
corporate governance convergence in different systems, especially between Canadian
system and Chinese system, are vague. The possibilities of convergence between
different systems, especially between Canadian and Chinese system with regard to
this thesis should be analyzed.
As we stated in the previous parts, China's special social, cultural and economic
conditions render little support to the prospect of complete convergence of Chinese
corporate governance practices with international models. However, convergence in
some areas would be possible and beneficial, partial divergence from international
best practices will be inevitable. It is therefore vital for China to develop its own
socially and economically based corporate governance system and directors' duties to
protect and maximize stakeholders' interests. As the above statement, the
characteristics of state-owned and state-controlled companies in China decide its
insider control model of corporate governance. Due to this model of corporate
256 See Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman, The end of history for corporate law Georgetown Law
Journal. Washington: Jan 2001. Vol. 89, Iss. 2; pg. 439, 30 pgs.
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governance in Chinese state-owned and state-controlled, it is essential to introduce
appreciate mechanisms to prevent the problem of insider control and maintain the
accountability ofthe board of directors.
As one of the Anglo-Saxon model countries, Canadian system of corporate
governance has the characteristics of its system. However, it also has its own
peculiarity which is different from other Anglo-Saxon countries, i.e. the concentration
of its ownership structure.
A number of factors that influence the development of national systems of
corporate governance, although it is not always clear whether these factors are the
cause or outcome of systems of corporate governance.257 The following discussions
are the factors that stipulate and impede convergence of corporate governance in the
Canadian and Chinese perspectives.
1. Issues for Convergence of National Systems of Corporate Governance
a) Globalization and Drive toward Efficient Corporate Structure
In Canada, corporate governance belongs to the Anglo-Saxon model, whereas
China favors the Continental-German model where they have a supervisory
committee in the company and the banks are very much involved in the ownership of
the firms. The world is converging into one model, when you have a global
environment where people trade with each other very closely. With the globalization
and the drive towards efficient corporate governance, all the talk of different models
in corporate governance will die down because the world is getting smaller and there
are a lot of transactions, trade, cross-ownership of companies and trading of shares
around the world. With the trend of globalization, there are many forces such as
product and capital markets competition around the world, flow of rapid information
257 See generally, M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and 1. Walsh, The purposes and
accountability o/the corporation in contemporary society: Corporate governance at a crossroads, Law
and Contemporary Problems. Durham: Summer 1999. Vol. 62, Iss. 3; p. 9.
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across national boundaries, dissemination of best corporate practices that will induce
different systems of corporate governance to converge rapidly in the world's
globalizing economics.
Several factors affect the process of corporate convergence world-widely. These
are the increasing globalization of financial markets, the introduction of the common
currency (i.e., the Euro), the effective progress in real convergence among countries,
the rapid and full incorporation of different economies in the international system of
settlement and payments and the rapid developments in transactions and trading
technologies. Among them, the growing globalization of financial markets is a key
factor of convergence of corporate governance systems. Different scholars have
different views with regard to the impacts of globalization on corporate governance
convergence. Some scholars have argued that globalization should pressure firms to
adopt a common set of the most efficient corporate governance practices, while others
maintain that such convergence will not occur because of a variety of forms of
path-dependence.258 From the author's point of view, globalization, as an increasing
outside pressure, leads to an observable result which appears indistinguishable from
convergence.259
The term "globalization" appears to have been given currency by Theodore
Levitt260 in the 1985 OECD publication "The Globalization of Markets" and served
to heighten awareness of reconfiguration of the international economy, including
increasing mobility and diversity of world capital, investment, production and
258 Khanna, T., J. Kogan, and K. Palepu. "Globalization and Corporate Governance Convergence? A
Cross-Country Analysis." Working Paper, Harvard Business School (2002).
259 Reinhard H. Schmidt and Gerald Spindler, Path Dependence. Corporate Governance and
Complementarity, p.8. This paper is provided by Goethe University Frankfurt am Main in its series
Working Paper Series: Finance and Accounting with number 27. at: http://finance.uni-frankfurt.de/
(Access date: Feb. 26,2004).
260 Theodore (Ted) Levitt is the Edward W. Carter Professor of Business Administration Emeritus at
the Harvard Business School and former editor of the Harvard Business Review. His first article of
"The Globalizati on of Markets." Published on May I, 1983, his recent publication of "The
Globalization of Markets" Published on January, 2004. For detail, see Levitt. Theodore. "The
Globalization of Markets" Harvard Business Review. Boston: May/Jun 1983. Vol. 61, Iss. 3; p. 92
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consumption. Globalization entails a lofting of barriers to the mobility of capital,
products, and labor, leading to an intensification of competition for these factors
across borders by firms and countries.261
The recent studies show that the interest in financial markets may well attest to
the so-called globalisation of such markets. The globalization of financial markets
impacts on corporate governance by the way of changing the long-established
domestic patterns of finance in different countries.
With China's entry into the World Trade Organization, its financial system will
face enormous changes and increasing pressure from foreign competition in the
coming years. China has made wide-ranging commitments across the whole financial
sector. In the banking sector, it has agreed to full market access in five years for
foreign banks. Foreign banks will be able to conduct local currency business with
Chinese enterprises and Chinese individuals two years and five years, respectively,
since China's accession to WTO. In China's securities' market, the controversial
issuance quota system has been abandoned, according to a plan of CSRC. Controls
over primary market prices will be relaxed, and eventually prices will be determined
by market forces. A series of reforms with respect to the Chinese financial market
have been implemented since China's open to the world. The more globalized China's
financial market makes the convergence of Chinese system of corporate governance
possible.
International economies, through organization such as WTO, are already taking
the place of national and regional economies. Currencies will be merged and banking
will be more international than ever.
Globalization seems not to be about convergence to best practice, but rather about
261 See Krishna Palepu, Tarun Khanna and Joe Kogan, Globalization and Similarities in Corporate
Governance: A Cross-Country Analysis, Working Paper No. 02-31, at: ssm.com (access date: Jun. 21,
2004), p.4.
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leveraging difference in an increasingly borderless world.262 Nat ions which have
opened themselves to the global markets with their different legal systems, providing
protection to the global investors and having attracted more capital in the process of
globalization. With the growth of capitalization in both the developed and the
developing, transitional economies, such as Canada and China, the need to establish
good corporate governance practices has push them minimize the gap of difference
between different nations to keep pace with the globalization process. However,
corporate governance practices of different nations are not uniform. This diversity
may be particularly because of the different legal structures and cultural settings
adopted by different nations.
b). International Convergence in Corporate Governance Systems
For as long as the studies that there is tendency of convergence in different
corporate governance systems across countries, there has been debate about the
convergence in different corporate governance systems.
Shleifer and Vishnl63 assert that good corporate governance systems are rooted
In an appropriate combination of legal protection of investors and some form of
concentrated ownership. The Canadian system relies somewhat more heavily on both
stronger legal protection and concentrated ownership, while the Chinese systems is
characterized by weaker legal protection but much more concentrated equity
ownership.
Hansmann and Kraakman264 assert the possibility of convergence towards one
single governance model. In their point, several features of the modern corporate form
are nearly universally adopted; i.e. the managers should act in the interests of
262 See Guillen, Mauro F. Diversity in Globalization: Organizational Change in Argentina, South
Korea, and Spain. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 2000.
263 Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny. "A Survey of Corporate Governance." Journal ofFinance , 52 (1997),
737-783.
264 See Hansmann, H. and R. Kraakman, The end of history for corporate law Georgetown Law
Journal. Washington: Jan 2001. Vol. 89, Iss. 2; pg. 439, 30 pgs.
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shareholders in an approaching global economy. They believe three principal factors
driving economies towards consensus: the failure of alternative models
(manager-oriented, labor-oriented, and state-oriented models of corporate law), the
competitive pressures of global commerce, and the shift of interest group influence in
favor of an emerging shareholder class. They admit that convergence in corporate
governance practices proceeds faster than convergence in corporate law; however
they expect that the pressure for convergence in law will be strong and ultimately
successful.
China is increasingly influenced by the common law model. In China, such laws
are meant to reduce asset stripping by directors and managers of state-owned
companies?65
Historical analysis shows that fiduciary duties in common law system is an
element that attracts different corporate governance practices to close the
Anglo-Saxon model. The world "fiduciary" is from the Latin, ''fiducia,'' which means
trust. The fiduciary duty is described as follows: 'A fiduciary is someone who has
undertaken to act for or on behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances
which give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The distinguishing obligation
of a fiduciary is the obligation of loyalty. The principle is entitled to the single-minded
loyalty of his fiduciary' .266 The fiduciary duty is a mechanism invented by the legal
system for filling in the unspecified terms of shareholders contingent contracts.267 In
265 Liu , Lawrence s. "Chinese Characteristics Compared: A Legal and Policy Perspective ofCorporate
Finance and Governance in Taiwan and China at ssm.com
(http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/delivery.cfm/delivery.cfm/SSRN ID273174 codeO 1061 2560.pdf?abstracti
d=273174 access date: Apr. 26, 2004).
266 See Dine, J., The Governance of Corporate Groups, (Cambridge University Press, 2000) p.190,
cites from Deakin, S. and Hughes, A., in Company Directors, 236-7. In Hospital Products Ltd V
United States Surgical Corp. (1984), 156 C.L.R. 41 (H.C.Aust.) per Gibbs C.J. at p.68. Fiduciary is
defined that "A person who has agreed, or who has undertaken, to act for or on behalf of, or in the
interest of, another person in respect of the exercise of a power of discretion which will affect the
interest of that other person in a legal or practical sense.
267 See Macey, Jonathan R. and Miller, Geoffrey P., Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual
Perspective (1993) 43 U. T. L. J. pAOI.
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a fiduciary relationship, good faith and fair dealing, rather than legal obligation, form
the basis of the transaction.268
The imposition of fiduciary duties on directors of companies has long been
consideration by academics.269 Anglo-Saxon company law is permeated by trust law
concepts - the fiduciary duty. Continental European Law has no comparable
concept.270 As noted above, China's Company Law, based on Continental European
Law commercial and civil models, and also does not introduce the concept of
fiduciary duty of directors and managers. Instead, directors are imposed upon the duty
to "faithfully perform their duties and protect the interests of the company." However,
some scholars think that it depots the "codification" of Anglo-Saxon fiduciary duties
and could ultimately work to protect the fiduciary relations inherent in a corporate
setting.271 Moreover, CSRC Opinions is relatively more specific. CSRC Opinions
adds fiduciary duty to the basic requirements of independent directors. Independent
director shall comply with laws and regulations of the state and shall be responsible to
all the shareholders with fairness and impartiality.
The fiduciary duties that grow out of the fiduciary relationship between directors
and their corporations supplement the statutory duties set out in the OBCA and the
CBCA?72
268 See Enoch Larbi Aboagye, Debt Financing: An Emerging Irifluence on Corporate Governance?
(LL.M. Thesis, McGill University, 2001), p.33, cite from Schwarch, S. L., Re-thinking a Corporations'
Obligations to Creditors (1996) 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 647. at 655.
269 L. Sealy, Fiduciary Relationships (1962) Cambridge Law Journal 69; A. Boyle, A-G v Reid: The
Company Law Implications 16 Company Lawyer (5), 131; L. Sealy, The Director as Trustee in E.
McKendrick (ed.) Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations (Oxford University Press,
Oxford, 1992); etc..
270 See Cally Jordan, Law matters: Corporate governance Legal reforms, 2000, at:worldbank.org.
271 See Nikkel, M. I., "Chinese characteristic" in corporate clothing: questions offiduciary duty in
China's Company Law, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 526 (1995-1996), p.526.
272 See McGuinness, K.P., The Law and Practice of Canadian Business Corporations, (Toronto and
Vancouver: Butterworths, 1999), p.715-715.
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c). Influence of Institutional investors on Convergence
The interest of institutional investors in transparent, comparable and consistent
international environment may well force the invested firms to operate at the global
level to converge upon a common mode of corporate governance. Institutional
investors are becoming more influential in corporate governance around the world,
even in bank-dominated countries. 273 The Anglo-Saxon model of corporate
governance which depends on global financial markets may become the reference
mode for such firms whatever their national origins. The arrival of Canadian
institutional investors on Chinese market has led to a resurgence of interest in the
issues of convergence of corporate governance in China. Two competing models of
corporate governance were thought to exist in separate spheres prior to the
diversification policy of institutional investors. The demands of institutional investors
for a strategic focus are increasingly converging with China national interests. The
demand ofexploring the biggest potential market in the world is the drive of Canadian
corporations as well as Canadian national interests.
The growing dominance of both domestic and international institutional investors
is casting a sharp focus on their corporate performance. It has been suggested that
there are some considerations which are useful to separate discussion of the
convergence in Canadian model and Chinese model. The former is showing an
increase in direct influence of institutional investors.274 The latter remain more firmly
in the bank-relationship based corporate governance model. Moreover, such
differences in the institutional investors should not be exaggerated, and the
convergence is discernible.
Recent empirical and academic studies show that institutional investors are
273 See Davis, E. Philip Institutional investors, corporate governance and the performance of the
corporate sector Economic Systems Vol: 26, Issue: 3, September, 2002 pp. 203-229.
274 As one of the Anglo-Saxon model countries, Canada has the institutional investors who are
influences by poor performance of Canadian firms, and the scope for such pressure offered by the
loosening grip of foreign multinationals and family owners. See Simon B (1993), "Investors revolt in
sleepy Canada", Financial Times, 18/5/93.
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gaining importance as shareholders in all nations, and institutional investors are now
becoming international in outlook. Either through active portfolio selection or through
"investor activism", institutional investors are seeking means to require better
governance to give greater concern to shareholder financial return when formulating
corporate strategy. Moreover, institutional investors tend to apply uniform corporate
performance globally and put great pressure on different corporate governance models
to produce competitive returns and resort to international standards concerning the
non-controlling shareholders protection.
d). De facto Convergence of One and Two tier board
In Canada, as in most Anglo-Saxon countries, shareholders are represented by the
board of directors in monitoring and controlling management. In the case of China, a
two-tier structure is used in which a supervisory board is imposed and charged with
overseeing both the board of directors and executive managers. The pros and cons of
the one-tier and two-tier board system have been and still are the subject of extensive
academic discussion. One of the major corporate governance differences between
Canada and China is the board structure - one-tier and two-tier board system.
However, notwithstanding this difference between one-tier and two-tier board systems,
the similarities in actual board practices are significant.
Theoretical and empirical studies show that supervisory function and a
managerial function are recognized by either one-tier or two-tier board system,
although the distinctions between the two functions tend to be more formalized in the
Chinese two-tier structure. The Canadian one-tier system may result in a closer
relation and better information flow between the supervisory and managerial bodies;
however, the Chinese two-tier system encompasses a clearer, formal separation
between the supervisory board and board of directors. The tendency of the good
corporate governance adoption worldly influences each system to lessen the
differences as practices converge.
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With regard to the supervisory function, non-executive directors in Canadian
one-tier board system and the supervisory board in Chinese two-tier board system
have the same fundamental responsibilities and the same important role to play in the
overall corporate governance system respectively. As well as the audit committee as a
permanent committee of the Board of Directors in Canadian one-tier board system has
the same function of the Supervisory Board in Chinese two-tier board system.
Canadian board structures have changed in the direction of two-tier boards in
which the functions of decision management and decision control are separated. The
use of subcommittees composed of outsiders for remuneration, auditing, nomination
and other issues introduces elements of a two-tier system. And so does the increasing
separation of the positions as chairman of the board and chief executive officer /
managerial director.
2. Issues against Convergence in National Systems of Corporate Governance
Although the foregoing discussion has stressed the issues for convergence in
corporate governance, significant legal and economic transitions in both countries,
there are some issues against convergence in national systems of corporate
governance. The following discussions will touch these issues in Canadian and
Chinese contexts.
a). Path Dependency
The political and historical reasons for national idiosyncrasies in economic
organization have been the topic of many discussions among scholars. "Path
dependence", which was discussed in the Part Four, is the most argument rebutting
the possibility of convergence, and has been considered as a significant factor in
determining national systems of corporate governance. One version of its role is that
the corporate structures at any point in time will depend on those that existed at the
outset, and that corporate rules affecting ownership will also depend on those initial
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structures.275 Another is that differing national cultures and values can de directly
associated with characteristics of a system of corporate governance and are likely to
defeat attempts to import elements of governance systems from countries with
fundamentally different culture and values.276
The advocates of theory argue that systems of corporate governance do not
develop in a vacuum, but that they are shaped by the social and political factors
specific the time and place where they developed, as well as the structure of firms to
they relate.277
b). Legal Issues
Although legal infrastructure and its dynamics are included in the path
dependency argument as they are an important part of the institutional apparatus,278
research report showed that corporate legislations in different countries have the signs
of convergence towards each other. However, due to legislative action, legal
convergence proceeds more slowly than convergence in corporate governance
practices.
National special social, cultural and economic as well as legislative conditions
render also little support to adopt directly appreciate legal framework leading to
efficient corporate governance. This does not mean that there is no legal convergence.
This contrariety means that sooner or later domestic business activity will move to
places and countries which offer more flexible, properly supervised and
275 See L.A. Bebchuk and MJ Roe, "A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate Ownership and
Governance" Columbia Law School Center for Law and Economic Studies Working Paper no 131 at
ssrn.com or Stanford Law Review, Vol. 52, pp. 127-170,1999
276 See A N Licht, "The Mother of All Path Dependencies, Towards a Cross-Cultural Theory of
Corporate Governance Systems" 26. Del. J. Corp. Law 147- 209 (2001).
277 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk and Mark 1. Roe, "A Theory of Path Dependence in Corporate
Ownership and Governance" (1999) 52 Stanford L. Rev. 6 .
278 Nestor, S. and Thompson, 1. (1999). Corporate governance patterns in DECO Economies: is
convergence under way? Conference on Corporate governance in Asia: A comparative perspective,
Seoul, March 3-5, p. 22. at: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/1 0/193 1460.pdf (access date: Aug. 12,
2004)
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business-oriented environments.
In the Canadian tradition, the corporate concept is based on a fiduciary
relationship between shareholders and the managers. In the Chinese tradition, the
company has an independent will, i.e. in theory, what is good for the corporations
might not be good for its shareholders. These differences penetrate down to company
law particulars such as shareholder rights, the role of statutory capital and the
responsibility of the board.
It seems that corporate governance-related legislation has been converging over
the past few years. Gilson provides a useful categorization of the different forms of
convergence that occur in the field of corporate regulation. Formal convergence
involves change in the legal infrastructure and therefore requires political support and
resort to the legislative process.
Canada, since the last three decades of 20th century, has been increasingly
influenced by United States' corporate legislative ideas. The US influence was strong
on the Ontario reforms of the 1970s and also the Dickerson Report, which led to the
Canadian Business Corporations Act.
China's Company Law of 1994 follows the old Continental style of corporate
legislation. As the superstructure to corporate laws, China's securities law did not
follow the civil law style of securities laws and is increasingly influenced by the
American common law modeI.279 Recent Chinese legislation has substantially tilted
the control of the decision making process toward shareholders and has increased
transparency in the way accounts are prepared, especially as regards consolidation; it
has also made important steps in facilitating takeovers.
The motivation behind the Canadian system of corporate governance is the
279 Liu, L.S. "Chinese Characteristics Compared: A Legal and Policy Perspective of Corporate Finance
and Governance in Taiwan and China." P. 2. Working Paper (2001), at: ssm.com.
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natural development of economy and the industry in the Canada. Relevant statutes in
the Canada are based on the ''judge-made law" that was pushed by the economic
requirement. While in China, the motivation of promulgation of Company Law is the
reform of state-owned enterprises. China's government hoped to establish a modern
corporate system and to create a tool to promote China's economic development.
Although the impediment of legal issues to the convergence of corporate
governance, some researchers believe that legal convergence is increasingly
happening around the world. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) conclude that the successful
corporate governance systems, such as the U.S., the U.K., Germany and Japan rely on
some combination of concentrated ownership and investors' protection. They also
argue that other countries which lack the necessary legal protection tend to develop
good corporate governance systems.
c). Political Issue against Convergence
Institutional investors are increasingly seeking to diversify their portfolios and
invest overseas. They then look for reassurances that their investment will be
protected. As the above statement, institutional investors are increasingly leading the
domestic system of corporate governance to the good corporate governance. Political
issue is an important element in this process. Different political systems determine the
absorption of institutional investors.
Political systems around the world can be described as the socialism and
capitalism. Both of them influence the domestic model of corporate governance. The
failed experiments with socialist in the post World War II era reflect the conclusion
that state ownership and control over business does not best serve the public interest
or promote corporate performance. With alI of the capitalist system's failures, its
commitment to competition enabled it to outperform socialism. Any number of former
Soviet republics and Czechoslovakia has distributed "ownership vouchers" to their
citizens as a means of transition to private ownership. Countries that have been
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capitalist have become even more so with privatization of former SOEs. In China's
perspective, China's political system also impedes the convergence of corporate
governance. However, under the constraints of socialist ideology and economic and
political institutions, Chinese government adopts a gradual approach of political and
economic reform and is generally very cautious and selective in accepting the policy
suggestions proposed by western economists and international organizations with
regard to the governance convergence, which is quite different from that of the former
Soviet republics and Eastern European countries. In fact, convergence with other
systems of corporate governance has enhanced the corporate performance, and
facilitated the spread of modern corporate governance in China
In the corporate perspective, due to the conflict of interests, political resistance
poses a major obstacle to governance reform which leads to good corporate
governance. The benefits of reformed corporate governance are not distributed evenly;
interest groups of a company, such as labor unions, banks, controlling shareholders,
and managers may prevent governance reform from leading to the good one?80 I n
this condition, those who control corporations feel considerable pressure to adopt the
good corporate practices and structures gleaned from a global inventory.281
II Evidence of Convergence between the Systems of Corporate
Governance in Canada and in China
Canada and China are adopting different corporate governance models. From
these comparisons, we found that although these two countries are adopting different
corporate governance models, they have developed some mechanisms to narrow
down the differences. Therefore, by the above analysis, we may conclude that the
280 See, Bebchuk and Roe[I999], Coffee [I 999].
281 Branson, Douglas M., 2000. The Very Uncertain Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate
Governance. SSRN working paper. at 3.
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corporate governance systems adopted by the two countries have evidence of
convergence in the following aspects:
1. Corporate Structure
a). Ownership Structure
I 'd 'fi d h' k . 282· hBer e & Means I entl Ie owners Ip structure as a ey Issue In t e
development of national systems of corporate governance, although it is not clear
whether these issues are the cause or outcome of systems of corporate governance?83
While both Canada and China have many large firms with concentrated ownership,
both countries also contain a far larger number of corporations that are dispersedly
held. And the number of such firms is evidently growing. It follows that each of the
two jurisdictions must have an individual system of corporate law that is adequate to
handle the full range of ownership structures. This tendency can be seen in all the
concentrated ownership countries.
Corporate legislation and codes of Best Practice around the world are consistent
with convergence towards an Anglo-Saxon governance structure. 284 From the
beginning of corporate practice, China has constantly adopted corporate forms and
practices from western systems. For example, 1994 Company Law imports two types
of companies: limited companies and stock companies, which are similar to those of
Anglo-Saxon system (private companies and public companies). Furthermore, the
Code of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in China issued by CSRC in
January is used the US legal and regulatory systems as models.
282 A Berle and G Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (Transaction Publishers NJ
1991).
283 See generally, M. Bradley, C. Schipani, A. Sundaram and 1. Walsh, "The Purposes and
Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society: Corporate Governance at a CrossRoads"
62(3) (1999) Law and Contemporary Problems 9. (supra note 66)
284 Denis, Diane K. and McConnell, John J., "International Corporate Governance" (January 2003),
atssrn.com. p. 33.
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The market for corporate control serves as a cornerstone of corporate governance
theory by ensuring that resources are directed toward their most efficacious use.285
Conventional wisdom suggests that if management are running a firm effectively,
share price will fall, making the firm ripe for a takeover.286 The takeover is occurred
when government requests a healthy firm to take over another one. The significant
increase in merger and acquisition activity for Chinese firms in recent years is a
progress in the corporate governance and indicates another sign that the governance
structure of these corporations is changing toward a more Anglo-Saxon system.
Finally, the number of Chinese firms that recently have listed their shares on the
New York Stock Exchange indicates a trend toward a more Anglo-Saxon governance
structure.
Since the early 1980s a kind of competition among systems of
corporate governance has emerged. Despite the twentieth century
international hegemony of first the United Kingdom, followed by the
United States, it is by no means certain that the Anglo-American system
of governance as currently configured will win this competition.287
Although governance rules for concentrated corporations are similar to those of
publicly held corporations, Chapter 2 of the Chinese Corporate Law contains a
number of special provisions applicable only to these concentrated corporations. For
example, a corporation with "few shareholders" is not required to set up a board of
directors, but rather is only required to have a single executive director who may
serve concurrently as the manager. In addition, this type of corporation does not need
an entire board of supervisors, as one or two supervisors will suffice. The Chinese
Company Law also has different rules for concentrated corporations wholly-owned by
285 Young, M.N., & McGuinness, P.B. 2001. The missing link: Why stock markets have been
ineffective in Chinese SOE reform. Business Horizons, July-August: 55-62, p.58.
286 Ibid.
287 See Kester, Gilson, and Roe refer to the latter set of issues as the workings of a contractual--as
opposed to corporate--governance system. W. Carl Kester, Industrial Groups as Systems o/Contractual
Governance, 8 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 24 (1992); also see Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe,
Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial
Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871 (1993). At 874.
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the State and those that include a foreign investor.
b). Two-tier Board Structure vs. One-tier Board Structure
Two-tier board models are associated with independent board structure, whose
attributes are positively associated with the separation of decision-management from
decision-control; one-tier board models resemble dual structures, whose attributes are
negatively associated with this separation.288 Studies around the world show that
there is a tendency of two-tier board to transform towards a one-tier board
structure.289
Although the Chinese model resembles the German two-tier system with a board
of directors and a supervisory board, a closer look reveals significant differences. For
example, in China, there is no hierarchical relation between the board of directors and
the board of supervisors, and both directors and supervisors are appointed by, and
may be dismissed by shareholders. In contrast, the German supervisory board
oversees the board of directors, and the members of the board of directors are
appointed by, and may be dismissed by the board of supervisors.
From this point, the corporate board structure of Chinese companies is in essence
the one-tier board structure, although they have a so-called supervisory board which is
similar to German board system.290 The Chinese supervisory board is in charge of
supervising whether there are illegal behaviors of the managers and directors and it
288 Gregory F. Maassen and Frans A. J van de Bosch, Comparing Anglo-Saxon and
Continental-European Corporate Governance Models: A tendency towards convergence of one-tier
and two-tier board models? (Version: Jan. 26, 1997)
289 Ibid.
290 Comparing a sample of ten largest German DAX non-financial companies (www.onvista.de) with
ten largest Chinese domestically listed non-financial firms by total assets, it can be seen that the
average size of supervisory board is 21 and 5 for German and Chinese companies respectively. While
some 38% of German supervisors are employee representatives, the number is about 30% in China.
Many German employee representatives are officers of workers councils in other companies whereas
Chinese employee representatives come exclusively within the company. In addition, there is a strong
representation of the Communist Party on the supervisory board in state-owned or state-controlled
companies. We can see from this comparison, this is fundamentally different from the supervisory
board in Germany. For details, see Xiao, J.Z., Dahya, J., and Lin, Z., (2004).
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has no rights to interfere with corporate management and strategy. A theoretical study
from interviews data show that the Supervisory Board in Chinese companies plays
one of four roles: (l) an honored guest; (2) a friendly advisor; (3) a censored
watchdog; or (4) an independent watchdog, in response to both internal and/or
external stimuli.291 A s a result, the corporate board structure in China is often seen as
close to the Anglo-Saxon type one-tier board.292
2. Stock Exchanges and Financial Markets
Listing requirements are considered to be a very promising possible element with
regard to the convergence of different corporate governance systems. As a company,
from its own interest, the stock exchange has the right to decide the listing conditions
for all its investors. The companies have to adjust their governance performance to
reach the minimum requirements in order to be listed. Listing requirements are less
drastic than national legislation. Moreover they support harmonization, because a
common reason for listing is to expand the shareholder base worldwide.293
Listing on foreign exchanges is considered an important step of China's domestic
reform and its governance convergence with foreign governance. By selecting a
tightly regulated foreign exchange, a firm pre-commits to adhere to high standards of
corporate governance and/or disclosure.294 Convergence by hybrid method through
Chinese companies voluntarily listing their securities on Foreign exchanges is made
possible by a form of regulatory competition. By choosing a foreign listing, a Chinese
company selects a significant element of related governance rules in preference to
291 See Xiao, 1.Z., Dahya, 1., and Lin, Z., A Grounded Theory Exposition of the Role of the
Supervisory Board in China British Joumal ofManagement Vol. 15,39-55 (2004), pAO.
292 See Tian, G.L.H. (2001), State Shareholding and the Value of Chinese Firms, Working Paper,
London Business School.
293 Braendle, Udo C and Noll, Juergen, On the Convergence of National Corporate Governance
Systems, at 14, http://papers.ssrn.com/soI3/papers.cfm?abstract id=506522 (access date: Jul. 22,
2004).
294 Chemmanur, TJ., Fulghieri, P. (1999), A Theory of the Going-Public Decision, 12 Review of
Financial Studies, 249-279
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those of its own jurisdiction. A similar convergence mechanism has always been
available in listing countries with respect to corporate law.
Recent studies295 show that more and more Chinese companies have listed or
aspire to list on US, Canada or other Anglo-American countries exchanges and have
adapted their own corporate codes and standards to comply with the exchanges'
stringent requirements. In the corporate perspective, the reasons for doing so are very
pragmatic, and aim to increase the valuation of their companies. Under the
Memorandum of Understanding296 on regulatory cooperation with China, Chinese
enterprises can list on stock exchanges of any of the 21 countries, including Canada.
Corporate governance is strongly related to a firm's potential market value. Listing of
Chinese companies on Canadian exchange can promote companies to gain good
practices of Canadian system of corporate governance as well as the experiences of
Canadian well-established markets. Some evidences show the trend of listing of
Chinese companies on Canadian exchange, however, up to now, the number of
companies which has been listed on Canadian exchange is not ideal.297
The Memorandum of Understanding is also important for Canadian companies to
list on Chinese exchange and participate in joint ventures with Chinese companies in
China. Listing of Chinese companies on Canadian exchanges will give Canadian
investors a chance to share directly in returns from the high growth in China,
particularly by top-notch Chinese companies with lower risks, as listed enterprises
would have to meet Canadian securities standards. 298 This can push Canadian
companies to introduce its Anglo-Saxon model to Chinese companies and take
295 According to the study of Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, 82 Chinese enterprises had been
listed overseas by the end ofAugust 2003, raising more than US$2I billion.
296 Memorandum of Understanding between The China Securities Regulatory Commission and The
Participating Members of Canadian Securities Administrators regarding securities and fUtures
regulatory cooperation.
297 The only Chinese company currently listed in Canada - Hanfeng Evergreen Inc., on the Toronto
Venture Exchange - gained its listing by way of a merger with an already-listed Canadian stock.
298 See the web site of Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, at: www.asiapacificbusiness.ca
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advantage of the good part ofChinese model ofcorporate governance.
3. Legal Legislation in Chinese context
The experience in establishing a regulatory regime for listed companies in China
provides some indication of the extent to which convergence towards international
norms is a significant improvement in Chinese system of corporate governance. This
is of particular interest in China, in view of the stated objective of the company and
securities law of promoting a "socialist market economy". In particular, the
experience in China may provide some guidance as to elements of the corporate
governance framework effectively mandated by global capital markets and the
residual power left to individual countries to pursue their own objectives.
The Guidelines of 2002 299 have considerable evidence of convergence with
western models of corporate governance as almost all the articles contained in the
guidance have parallel provisions in the law or codes of corporate governance of
Canada and other Anglo-Saxon countries, such as the United Kingdom or United
States.
299 Guideline on the Management ofListed Companies
CONCLUSION
This thesis presents possibilities and empirical evidence about convergence
between the two countries - Canada and China - in the context of corporate
governance. An analysis of theories of firm and corporate governance from the related
academia, drawing on the features from two systems of corporate governance, giving
the detailed cooperation between the systems in cultural psychology, demonstrates
that national corporate governance exhibit its own characteristics during the process
of convergence.
Corporate governance has become an important issue in all the economies around
the world. As mentioned in this thesis, the debate on convergence and divergence in
corporate governance systems both in Canada and in China has forced us to
reconsider our assumptions on which legal rules and corporate governance system
promote efficient corporate performance and profitability. The contributions to this
thesis have offered insights on different approaches to the attributes of the internal
organization and power structure of the firm, the function of board of directors both in
one-tier and two tier system, the ownership structure of the firm, the role of securities
markets, the relationship among the board, management staff, shareholders in the two
systems respectively.
Influenced by the different political and legislative systems, national systems of
corporate governance take different modes in different countries. Rooted in different
political and legislative environments, the Canadian and Chinese systems of corporate
governance are also based on historical and cultural context resulting in distinct
national ownership and control features of firms. With the development of economic
globalization and other possibilities discussed in this thesis, convergence between the
two systems in most aspects of the law and practice of corporate governance is sure to
follow.
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With regard to the individual characteristics, as the above analysis, the Canada
model of corporate governance is characterized by a concentrated ownership structure,
mutual and pension funds as key shareholders, high market transparency, active
securities markets, and the importance of the market of corporate control as a
disciplining mechanism; the Chinese model of corporate governance has been
associated with a concentrated ownership structure, state as an important shareholders,
low market transparency, underdeveloped securities markets, and the absence of
hostile takeovers. The thesis has not argued that the Chinese system and Canadian
system of corporate governance have already converged towards each other. It has
merely identified an increasing tendency and predicts an intensification of this
tendency in the coming decades. It also focus on convergence that has not been based
on any functionalist assumption of a necessity to imitate the most successful
economic model but on the belief that it would be dangerous to underestimate or
ignore such tendencies.
With respect to the issue of convergence, most of the convergence studies of
different systems of corporate governance focus on the two generic governance
systems, bank based (insider) systems and market based (outsider) systems around the
world. For the market centered systems, convergence would require changes that
permitted more bank/financial institution ownership and hence monitoring of
companies; for the bank based systems, changes to induce convergence would require
improvement in capital markets, reduction of control by banks, and monitoring for
shareholder interests.30o
Through the analysis, we agree that one can not say the Canadian nor Chinese
system of corporate governance is superior to the other; the issue thus arises as to
whether there is a tendency in the two systems towards convergence.
300 Paul Halpern System Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems prepared for Conference and
Symposium on Corporate Governance and Globalization September I, 1999, at:
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/cmi/papers/paperl-I.htm (access date: Aug. 2, 2004).
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This thesis is to demonstrate that there is a tendency towards convergence, and
both different systems are gradually changing and becoming increasingly similar even
if both of the two systems are not typical ones in the world today.
To put the evolving system of Chinese corporate governance in context, some
reforms with regard to corporate governance have been taken place both on the
governmental and corporate levels. Reforms in Chinese system of corporate
governance reflect the convergence towards Anglo-Saxon system. However, due to
China's political attitudes, its legal framework, cultural and historical elements and its
particular path development, China's corporate development can not be as same as
that of other countries. Chinese current governance system has been designed under a
number of institutional constraints. The capital market is not yet completely reformed
and therefore is not effective. 301 There are only very weak external governance
mechanisms in place. The internal governance mechanism, which relies heavily on
the board of directors, is also in a transitional stage. The nomination of directors,
CEOs and even the members of supervisory board is still controlled to a large extent
by the state. The listed firms are not totally independent entities. All these problems
reflect the weak condition of Chinese system of corporate governance. It is important
that the successful models of corporate governance give necessary consideration to
the Chinese system of corporate governance.
Due to the little influence of Chinese system on other systems of corporate
governance, there is no apparent convergence of Canadian system of corporate
governance to the Chinese system of corporate governance. However, some changes
in Canadian system of corporate governance have also been found.
Although the tendencies as well as the empirical evidences of convergence, it is
clear from this thesis that convergence between Canadian system of corporate
governance and Chinese system of corporate governance mean neither the victory of
301 Young, M.N., & McGuinness, P.B. 2001. The missing link: Why stock markets have been
ineffective in Chinese SOE reform. Business Horizons, July-August: 55-62.
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one system over another, nor the uniformity of corporate governance norms and
behaviors. It should rather be seen as giving more choices to the firms, when it comes
to following a corporate finance and governance "path". In fact, the patterns of
ownership and control should ultimately correspond more to the needs and
characteristics of a particular firm than to the "system" prevalent in the two countries.
Firms should have the possibility to move smoothly from one system to another as
they grow and their needs and constituencies change.
On the basis of corporate governance, the strong economic accomplishment in
Canada and the emerging economic development in China would generally suggest
that their respective systems of corporate governance function well in their national
economic structures.
However, this does not guarantee that the economic accomplishment or
development achieved in the past has proven the efficiency and success of one
national system of corporate governance. An increasing economic globalization and
corporate scandals in boardrooms make the scholars around the world to reassess and
critically analyze different systems of corporate governance.
Although there is convergence tendency and evidences between the two systems
of corporate governance, this thesis also aims to illustrate the limitation of such
convergence. This thesis presents some issues which impede such convergence.
One key issue discussed in this thesis regarding the persistence of national system
is the path dependency. Much national variation in corporate governance reflects the
impact of path dependency upon the evolution of economic systems.302 On the path
dependency bases for divergence: reasons arising from the differing initial conditions
with which countries started. We can take other two countries for example, assume
that, except of their initial differences in corporate governance due to path dependency,
302 Coffee, J. c., (1999), The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate
Governance and its Implications, at: ssm.com. pAl.
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they have the similar economies, similar type of firms, and even the similar ideologies,
the initial difference in corporate governance will tend to persist rather than disappear
or converge completely. In Canada's context, an economy which shares a number of
similarities to the United States in terms of legal framework and corporate structures
and with an active capital market, there are very important differences in the actual
governance systems.3D3 In China's context, we also contend that the Chinese evolving
system of corporate governance will over time increasingly reflect China's own
situation, including its institutions, as well as its culture, traditions, and values. It is
important to note that simply copying either a model or mixed features of some
models may not generate desirable effects. This is because the different models rely
on their specific corporate governance environments and have their own historical,
social and economic origins, but it is unlikely that the same broad environmental
factors exist in one country.
In the outlook perspective, the development of corporate governance convergence
and divergence of different national systems are not inconsistent. The former refers to
the ongoing movement of national corporate legislations and performances toward a
common global standard. Ownership structures are changing very slowly in this
process, but motivated by market forces. Firm transparency and shareholder
protections are being increased in order to attract institutional investments which are
increasingly influencing the governance vice versa. The proliferation of corporate
governance guidelines and codes of best practice underscore both convergence and
divergence. The latter refers to the different maintenance of individual corporate rules
and best practices in the global convergence situation.
In the end, we can conclude that good corporate governance in either Canada or
China, however, will neither result from mere changes in the Corporate or Securities
laws, nor result from the convergence between the two systems of corporate
303 Paul Halpern System Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems prepared for Conference and
Symposium on Corporate Governance and Globalization September I, 1999, at:
http://www.rotman.utoronto.calcmilpapers/paperl-I.htm (access date: Aug. 2, 2004).
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governance. Good corporate governance will also depend mainly upon the successful
reform of government agencies and the legal system. Good corporate governance
systems and practices cannot only be legislated, nor is there only one model. There is
no perfect or best system or model in practice; it involves tradeoffs between
competing goals. Convergence is inevitable; however, it has its limits. Globalization is
an impact on convergence, and a singular mode of governance is unlikely. A singular
mode of corporate governance would require a reorganization of central institutional
structures and relationships, as well as a restructuring of interest-group relations and
perhaps, of their constitution and organization?04
304 See Corporate Governance and the Lack of Critical Reflexi vity: China and the Process or Principles
of Corporate Governance: Loong Wong, University ofNewcastle, Australia
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